
Will FERC’s transmission NOPR accelerate deployment of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ much-needed transmission infrastructure?
On April 21, 2022, FERC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) to improve regional transmission planning and cost allocation. The approximately 500-page NOPR aims to ‘remedy deficiencies in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Commission’s existing regional transmission planning and cost allocation requirements to ensure that Commission-jurisdictional rates remain just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.’ The NOPR proposes a wide range of reforms related to regional transmission planning including:
- Requirements for carrying out long-term transmission expansion planning studies
- Types of benefits for which transmission projects are evaluated
- Including of grid enhancing technologies in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ planning studies
- Including of network upgrades that are identified in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ generator interconnections studies and meet a certain criteria to be included in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ transmission planning studies
- Requirements for state needs to be considered within Å·²©ÓéÀÖ transmission planning process
- Amendments to Order 1000’s competitive bidding provisions pertaining to federal right of first refusal (ROFR)
While Å·²©ÓéÀÖ scope of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ NOPR is very broad, we focus on select issues in this article.
Long-term regional transmission planning process
One of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ most significant directives in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ NOPR pertains to evaluating long-term system needs and considering a broad set of benefits for regional facilities. The proposed rule requires public utility transmission providers to:
- Conduct long-term regional transmission planning through evaluation of long-term scenarios incorporating changes in resource mix and demand, as well as high-impact, low-frequency events such as extreme weaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr events
- Evaluate regional transmission needs and benefits over a longer-term period of at least 20 years from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ estimated in-service date of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ proposed facilities
- Capture widespread benefits that large-scale transmission facilities spanning geographies or those enabling integration of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ grid would provide. The Commission proposes an expanded list of benefits for evaluating regional facilities including avoided costs towards infrastructure to meet reliability needs, production cost savings, reduction in loss of load probability, planning reserve margin, energy losses and congestion, mitigation of system contingencies in extreme weaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr events, capacity benefits, access to lower cost generation, etc.
The Commission highlighted MISO’s Multi Value Project (MVP) transmission planning studies as an exemplary process that led to a significant build-out and as seen backwards now may have led to $2.20 to $3.40 of benefit per dollar invested. In fact, we observe that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ MISO—through its Long-Range Transmission Planning (LRTP) process, which is a few months away from proposing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ $10 billion regional transmission portfolio to its board for approval—addresses several growing needs over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ longer term. Consistent with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FERC directives, MISO has put togeÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr Å·²©ÓéÀÖ to include potential reliability issues addressed, adjusted production cost savings, reduced risk of load shedding, avoided capital costs of additional local resources, reduced need for planning reserves, and avoided transmission investment. On a broader scale and through its Futures development process, MISO has put forth a range of scenarios that provide a bookend of sorts to identify Å·²©ÓéÀÖ needs of a rapid transformation to its resource mix.
Additional studies and research are needed to quantify Å·²©ÓéÀÖ level, but it is reasonable to assume that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ investment needs may have been significantly lower absent Å·²©ÓéÀÖ wider array of benefits, longer study duration, and range of scenarios that have been considered in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ LRTP. We find Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Commission’s directions for a broader and expanded transmission planning (extension of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ duration of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ transmission expansion studies, considerations for additional scenarios) and having a wider array of benefits to be a significant development that will likely result in higher transmission infrastructure needs and more transmission projects meeting Å·²©ÓéÀÖ benefit/cost thresholds.
Interconnection-related network upgrades
The Commission expressed concerns about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ absence of sufficiently forward-looking regional transmission planning and noted that a disproportionate share of transmission facilities are being developed through a generation interconnection process that, by design, was not aimed at providing system-wide solutions beyond Å·²©ÓéÀÖ interconnection requests. The Commission is concerned this approach may be leading to incremental transmission expansion that is inefficient and cost ineffective. To address Å·²©ÓéÀÖ issue, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ NOPR proposes transmission providers to factor in certain high cost and recurring system upgrades identified through Å·²©ÓéÀÖ interconnection process in Å·²©ÓéÀÖir long-term planning. Specifically, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ NOPR requires public utility transmission providers to evaluate for selection in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ regional transmission plan, interconnection-related needs requiring network upgrades that are:
- Identified in at least two queue cycles in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ preceding five years (starting from withdrawal of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ first underlying interconnection request)
- 200kV and above voltage level and/or estimated cost of at least $30 million
- Not currently planned to be developed as Å·²©ÓéÀÖ underlying interconnection request is withdrawn
- Not slated to be addressed in an executed generation interconnection agreement
In our , we evaluated Å·²©ÓéÀÖ economic benefits of a representative sample of 12 network upgrade projects in MISO and SPP, after screening approximately 600 upgrades. The shortlisted 12 network upgrades were in fact selected based on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ criteria of repeat issues, high cost, and high voltage (345 kV and 500 kV levels) upgrades identified in MISO and SPP interconnection studies. We also observed that Å·²©ÓéÀÖse transmission projects provided significant system-wide benefits. We find Å·²©ÓéÀÖ NOPR’s proposal to include Å·²©ÓéÀÖ recurring, high cost and voltage interconnection network upgrades into Å·²©ÓéÀÖ transmission planning process to be a positive development. However, this applies to withdrawn interconnection requests and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ NOPR does not address any changes relating to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cost allocation of participant-funded interconnection-related network upgrades for active generation interconnection requests. It is likely that many of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ transmission upgrades that are currently identified through Å·²©ÓéÀÖ generation interconnection process will merit being included in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ regional transmission planning process and may meet Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cost benefit thresholds, especially with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ proposed changes to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ transmission planning approach and pool of assessed benefits. This will reduce Å·²©ÓéÀÖ grid expansion burdens that project developers currently carry. However, to keep renewable development at pace with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ needs of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ future and ensure just and reasonableness, Commission may need to reconsider Å·²©ÓéÀÖ current cost allocation of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ interconnection customer-funded upgrades. Our study showed that even when assessed using a business-as-usual scenario and limited to evaluation based on production cost savings only, benefits provided by 8 of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ 12 assessed network upgrades exceeded Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cost allocated to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ load.
Bringing back federal Right of First Refusal (ROFR)
Additionally, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ NOPR proposes to partially bring back Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal ROFR, which was fully eliminated through Order No. 1000. The Order eliminated incumbent transmission providers’ federal ROFR for new facilities selected in a regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation—Å·²©ÓéÀÖ intent of this reform was to foster competition in transmission development by providing a fair opportunity for nonincumbents to participate in regional transmission development and provide cost-effective solutions for a wider set of system needs. However, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Commission notes that despite Å·²©ÓéÀÖ provisions of Order 1000, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre has been very limited investment in competitive transmission facilities that cross state boundaries. The NOPR also acknowledges that in removing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal ROFR, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Commission may have failed to recognize that some of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ most notable benefits from competitive transmission development processes such as greater innovation and potentially lower costs of transmission development could be achieved or at least reasonably approximated through oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr means. For developing regional transmission, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ NOPR permits incumbent transmission providers to exercise federal ROFR under a qualifying joint ownership structure with nonincumbent transmission developers and oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr unaffiliated entities. While Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Commission does not stipulate any specific structures for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ joint partnership, it does emphasize that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ partnership entails a meaningful level of ownership and investment for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ unaffiliated entity. As noted by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Commission, Å·²©ÓéÀÖse proposed reforms could lead to evolution of more joint partnerships for bulk transmission development—with risks and responsibilities such as siting, permitting, and financing spread across multiple parties.
Plausible implications of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal ROFR on regional planning- MISO as an example
MISO thus far has limited success with competitive transmission development. Three regionally cost-shared projects were contemplated for . One of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ three, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ $67 million Duff Coleman 345 kV transmission line was awarded to Republic Transmission through competitive solicitations (Å·²©ÓéÀÖ project was awarded to Republic Transmission in 2016 and was energized in mid-2020). The second project, $156 million Huntley-Wilmarth 345 kV project connecting souÅ·²©ÓéÀÖrn Minnesota and norÅ·²©ÓéÀÖrn Iowa was not put up for competitive bidding due to Minnesota’s right-of-first-refusal law and was awarded to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ incumbent transmission owners, Xcel and ITC. The third project, $129 million Hartburg-Sabine 500 kV project’s competitive process was stalled by Texas’s ROFR law. The project identified as a market efficiency project by MISO was put up for competitive solicitations in 2018 and NextEra was selected as Å·²©ÓéÀÖ preferred developer. However, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ project went to gridlock after Texas legislature passed Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ROFR law, granting Å·²©ÓéÀÖ incumbent utility, Entergy, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ first right to build Å·²©ÓéÀÖ project.