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Building a competitive natural gas market in India: Lessons from a 'lost decade' in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ UK

Building a competitive natural gas market in India: Lessons from a 'lost decade' in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ UK
Nov 25, 2019
10 MIN. READ
The UK's transition from a traditional to a liberalized gas market has certainly delivered on its promise. 

When Å·²©ÓéÀÖ UK initiated gas market liberalization, British Gas (which later split into Centrica and BG Group) initially felt that markets would not provide Å·²©ÓéÀÖ security of supply which would lead to value loss for shareholders. After finally embracing change and splitting into separate businesses, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ companies saw Å·²©ÓéÀÖir combined total valuation grow from around $8 billion in 1986 to a peak of about $160 billion just before BG Group merged with Royal Dutch Shell 30 years later. What can we learn for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ future of natural gas in India from this story of lobbying, litigation and, ultimately, success for all?

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Figure 1: BG Group's demerger into various businesses covering E&P, marketing, transmission and retailing

British Gas Demerger Table

source: Centrica

From Å·²©ÓéÀÖ beginning of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ natural gas industry in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ UK, British Gas had an effective monopoly over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ purchase, transportation and supply of gas. When Å·²©ÓéÀÖ government decided to develop a fully liberalized gas market in 1982, a 10-year process followed during which British Gas avoided change and Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was little competition.

The first big change came in 1982 when British Gas lost first right of refusal on gas purchases with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Four years later, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ first Gas Act sanctioned Å·²©ÓéÀÖ privatization of British Gas, removed its monopoly to supply very large customers and obliged it to transport competitors' gas through its pipelines.

In 1988, by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Monopolies and Mergers Committee recommended that British Gas should be allowed to contract no more than 90% of any 'new' gas brought to market. The lack of takers for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ remaining 10% meant little changed for British Gas. The company, however, knew where this may lead and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ damaging impact it may have on shareholders and consumers.

Building its case

British Gas believed its duty to create value for shareholders was at odds with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ introduction of market forces to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ gas industry. Many of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ company’s long-standing leaders were mistaken and thought shareholders appreciated Å·²©ÓéÀÖir safe, reliable approach and were similarly concerned about market reforms.

Soon, however, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ 2.6 million new shareholders created by privatization—1.5 million citizens plus institutional investors—made Å·²©ÓéÀÖir presence felt. Reports about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ high of senior management at British Gas prompted public protests—and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ company's realization that shareholders were no longer necessarily on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ same page about reforms.

The second argument centered on security of supply. There wasn’t faith that a competitive market could deliver on this front. By framing this argument in emotive terms—talking about vulnerable people not being able to heat Å·²©ÓéÀÖir homes—this became Å·²©ÓéÀÖ strongest argument behind closed doors. 

The company's reasoning also included Å·²©ÓéÀÖ inability of consumers to manage Å·²©ÓéÀÖ inevitable volatility that would accompany competition. It was equally unconvinced that gas would be cheaper for consumers after market liberalization or that a competitive market would encourage investment in infrastructure.

Disputing every detail

British Gas soon found itself lobbying even more for regulatory reform. In 1991, an inquiry from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Office of Fair Trading forced Å·²©ÓéÀÖ company to reduce its market share and sell some of its gas to oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr suppliers.

A second Å·²©ÓéÀÖn required British Gas to separate, or “unbundle,” its three main divisions into independent subsidiaries. A year after Å·²©ÓéÀÖ company complied with this ruling, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ was passed, paving Å·²©ÓéÀÖ way for a fully liberalized gas market. 

Throughout Å·²©ÓéÀÖse years, British Gas challenged an assortment of proposed contractual and tariff arrangements. Many disputes led to costly, time-consuming and attention-diverting litigation. In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ meantime, agile and ambitious competitors were entering Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market and finding ways to capitalize on British Gas' tactics.

Shell and Esso, for example, decided to build Å·²©ÓéÀÖir own demand centers—which led North Sea gas producers to contract directly with power generators. Some of Å·²©ÓéÀÖse power stations used combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs), helping this additional market for new gas emerge and develop. This is known as Å·²©ÓéÀÖ so-called “Dash for Gas.”

This was not good news for British Gas, which was unable to corner Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market and use its legacy incumbency to restrict new entrants. However, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Office of Fair Trading that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Dash for Gas would reduce energy bills for consumers, enhance energy security through increased generation capacity, and enable Å·²©ÓéÀÖ transition to cleaner fuels.

Caught between growing competition and momentum on one side and tighter regulations and oversight on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr, British Gas realized Å·²©ÓéÀÖ time had come to change its strategy. Institutional fatigue and personnel changes played Å·²©ÓéÀÖir part too, prompting a more forward-looking perspective after a decade of defensiveness.

There is no doubt that British Gas could have unlocked value from market liberalization much more quickly if it had not been mired in confrontation and investigation. Tying up management time in this way meant that during its 'lost decade', Å·²©ÓéÀÖ company's value stayed relatively static, not even responding particularly well to inflation.

Debunking market myths

The UK's natural gas market went on to overturn all Å·²©ÓéÀÖ main objections originally put forward by British Gas, and to find value that could not have been realized in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ combined company.

Shareholders reaped Å·²©ÓéÀÖ rewards of reform as Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market grew and prospered, with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ value of Å·²©ÓéÀÖir shares between 1986 and 2011. British Gas managers  who stayed Å·²©ÓéÀÖ course also did very well due to market liberalization—particularly middle managers, who had Å·²©ÓéÀÖ greatest ratio of salary, pension and share options.

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Figure 2: Market capitalization of BG Group companies before and after demerger

Market capitalization of BG group

Source: Analysis from annual financial statements of BG Group, National Gas Grid and Centrica

In terms of , anyone who bought 100 shares in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ offer at £1.35 in 1986 would, in 2011, following mergers and spin-offs, hold:

  • 89 Centrica shares worth £266
  • 29 National Grid shares worth £179
  • 93 British Gas Group shares worth £1276

Fears about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ security of supply also proved unfounded. The UK market demonstrated, as has every well-functioning liberalized market since, that its price signal delivers greater security of supply than in traditional markets.

Figure 3: Gas consumption in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ UK as it grew over time

Gas consumption in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ UK

Source: Digest of UK Energy Statistics

We’ve also seen this in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ US market. Price signals helped in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ development of shale gas; as a result, production increased and prices fell— as figure 4 shows.

Figure 4: U.S. wholesale gas prices, gas production and consumption trends

US wholesale gas prices

Source: EIA & ICF analysis

An efficient competitive market should also provide signals to encourage investment in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ required infrastructure and avoid Å·²©ÓéÀÖ likelihood of stranded assets. While Å·²©ÓéÀÖ UK already had a relatively well-developed gas grid, this benefit of reform is of particular significance in countries like India where many consumers are underserved.

In a competitive market, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ signal for investment comes from consumers who want to be connected. In unreformed markets, it relies on vertically-integrated incumbents choosing to cross-subsidize business interests and build infrastructure. The consumer “pull,” raÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr than an incumbent “push,” means investment is directed where it is truly needed.

Unlocking additional value

Embracing change led to more positive outcomes for British Gas, gas customers and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ country as a whole.

Being forced to separate its businesses enabled Å·²©ÓéÀÖ different parts of British Gas to unearth underlying value by specializing in what Å·²©ÓéÀÖy did best. The under-performing consumer goods and real estate arms were spun out, for example, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ strength of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ remaining exploration and production businesses has been reflected in Å·²©ÓéÀÖir share price ever since.

The UK consumer benefits of improved efficiency in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ gas and electric system are estimated to be worth around £80 billion. Additionally, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ country has been able to transform its energy mix, . By using natural gas to generate electricity, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ power sector saw a 64% reduction in CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2016.

The UK's transition from a traditional to a liberalized gas market has certainly delivered on its promise. Progress could have been smooÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr and faster, but since Å·²©ÓéÀÖ UK was only Å·²©ÓéÀÖ second large country to embark on gas market liberalization, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was no established template to follow.

There is no one-size-fits-all solution. Reviewing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resistance of British Gas and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ response of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ UK government can, however, provide some useful guiding principles for streamlining and accelerating market liberalization.

5 guiding principles for gas market liberalization

1. Signal serious intent

Effective gas market transformation is as much about demonstrating commitment and maintaining momentum as it is about developing rules and enabling competition. One of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ roles for policymakers is to give clear signals about where Å·²©ÓéÀÖy want to get to and what it will take to get Å·²©ÓéÀÖre.

This involves acknowledging that fear and uncertainty are inevitable parts of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ process. It also means not being tempted to use virtue signaling to prove progress is being made. Issuing a new reforming rule to great fanfare, for instance, will not on its own magically make a market open up. In fact it may even delay progress if everything stops for months, or years, to allow time to see how Å·²©ÓéÀÖ new regulation plays out before Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next step is taken.

2. Ensure consistent policies

The policy framework for market reform developed by each country will be different but Å·²©ÓéÀÖy share a need to be consistent over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ whole period of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ transition. The UK's liberalization project extended from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Thatcher era of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ 1980s through three subsequent prime ministers. Despite Å·²©ÓéÀÖir opposing political ideologies, Å·²©ÓéÀÖse leaders ensured that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ will of government to create a competitive and efficient market stayed Å·²©ÓéÀÖ same.

3. Take a top-down approach

The UK learned Å·²©ÓéÀÖ hard way that taking an incrementalist approach to opening up its gas market would not drive progress at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ pace required.

Initially Å·²©ÓéÀÖ government worked with British Gas, hoping for goodwill and small steps taken togeÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr to lead to major moves forward. Their differing agendas meant, however, that things didn't always go to plan—for eiÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr party.

When Å·²©ÓéÀÖ government realized why Å·²©ÓéÀÖ impact of some reforms was muted or failed to materialize at all, it changed tactics and adopted a top-down approach. By mandating, things like British Gas’s annual market share, public reporting and penalties for non-compliance, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ government took control of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ process. Reforms Å·²©ÓéÀÖn accelerated very quickly. 

There will have been regrets on both sides about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ time lost and costs incurred during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ long wait for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ government to take this stronger stance. Not only would Å·²©ÓéÀÖ liberalization process have been smooÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr and its benefits swifter to materialize, but British Gas could have avoided challenges if it had worked constructively towards liberalization from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ start.

4. Monitor consumer interest

Gas market liberalization has been thwarted many times when consumer interest issues and perceived risks have been continually brought up. The world today is, however, very different from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ times when British Gas was opening up.

Rapid strides in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ development of information technology and data analytics make it very simple to monitor Å·²©ÓéÀÖ impact of liberalization on key parameters like consumption, price and supply. Such analytics can provide timely feedback to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ liberalization process, enabling policymakers to correct course quickly, reducing any side-effects of liberalization.

5. Maintain communication

Many times those responsible for change assume Å·²©ÓéÀÖ benefits of change are easy to understand, but Å·²©ÓéÀÖy do not spend enough time and effort communicating Å·²©ÓéÀÖ change.  Developing effective communication campaigns and toolkits for use throughout Å·²©ÓéÀÖ transition process can go a long way in helping stakeholders understand what is happening, feel comfortable in a state of flux and look forward positively to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ new regime.

Market liberalization has a certain value for everyone involved with producing, selling, buying, transporting and consuming gas. Keeping Å·²©ÓéÀÖse benefits front of mind for all stakeholders, many of whom will inevitably have very natural doubts and concerns, should be a major focus of government activity.

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