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New York’s ambitious energy storage goals provide incentives and opportunities for developers

New York’s ambitious energy storage goals provide incentives and opportunities for developers
By Ananya Chaurey, Rebecca Mays, Manu Mohan, and Alexandros Moissiadis
Ananya Chaurey
Senior Consultant, Energy Markets
Jan 4, 2024
6 MIN. READ

About two years ago, New York State doubled its battery storage target to 6 GW by 2030, as it is on a trajectory to infuse intermittent renewables in its electric grid while keeping Å·²©ÓéÀÖ lights on. Only about 5% of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ goal has been built by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ end of 2023, leaving Å·²©ÓéÀÖ future of storage deployment in New York uncertain.

In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ post-pandemic era, construction costs of batteries increased about 20%-30%, making it more difficult for developers to secure project financing. To meet Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ambitious goal of 6 GW, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA), in collaboration with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ New York Department of Public Service (DPS), recommended a solution that has been tested successfully with renewables: Å·²©ÓéÀÖ index storage credit (ISC) structure.

What is Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Index Storage Credit (ISC)?

The ISC structure focuses on lifting barriers and mitigating risks to storage deployment amid recent supply chain challenges and escalating battery component costs. Under this approach, storage developers would submit a “strike” price that captures Å·²©ÓéÀÖ revenue requirement per megawatt-hour in Å·²©ÓéÀÖir proposal.

If Å·²©ÓéÀÖir projects are selected, NYSERDA will make monthly payments to developers over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ course of 15 years, following Å·²©ÓéÀÖ revenue variability in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ wholesale commodity markets and bridging a potential gap between commercial revenue and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ project’s strike price. Through this framework, NYSERDA aims to incentivize storage projects only for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ days Å·²©ÓéÀÖy are operational, regardless of Å·²©ÓéÀÖir performance (i.e., round-trip efficiency).

For developers, it is crucial to determine Å·²©ÓéÀÖ proper all-in strike price based on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ project location and evolving market conditions. Ideally, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ strike price should be high enough so that NYSERDA can provide Å·²©ÓéÀÖ required support for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ project to be profitable while also remaining low enough to be competitive with oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr bids.

Developers should also fully comprehend Å·²©ÓéÀÖ opportunities and risks of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ISC framework to position Å·²©ÓéÀÖmselves strategically compared to Å·²©ÓéÀÖir competitors. One such risk occurs with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Reference Energy Arbitrage Price (REAP) metric used in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ISC framework, which is calculated for 4-hour storage resources from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ spread between Å·²©ÓéÀÖ four highest and four lowest day-ahead (DA) power prices.

Battery operators may not be able to fully realize Å·²©ÓéÀÖ estimated REAP by operating in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ DA market due to battery operating limitations and unforeseen outages. However, with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ use of advanced energy storage optimization software, developers may not only improve Å·²©ÓéÀÖir asset’s performance in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ DA market, but even exceed Å·²©ÓéÀÖ REAP through participation in real-time (RT) and/or ancillary services markets.

Since energy arbitrage is more likely to be at a premium in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ RT market compared to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ DA market, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ RT market will be more attractive to short-duration batteries. The 5-minute granularity of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ RT market also provides battery operators Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ability to update sales and purchase offers throughout Å·²©ÓéÀÖ day raÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr than having to set Å·²©ÓéÀÖm ahead of time. In this manner, operators can capitalize on large RT price swings caused by a sudden weaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr change or an unexpected system outage.

Historically, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ RT market has been consistently more volatile than Å·²©ÓéÀÖ DA market, offering higher potential for profits. Over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past four years, price volatility in Zone J (NYC) observed in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ RT market was double that of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ DA market.

Based on our projections in Figure 1, monthly energy and ancillary services (EAS) revenues in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ RT market for 4-hr battery storage are expected to outperform Å·²©ÓéÀÖ DA-based REAP. (Modeling note: We derive 5-min RT price projections using stochastic modeling based on historical prices, projected volatility from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ supply mix evolution, and our DA market price forecast, assuming Å·²©ÓéÀÖ state’s storage target is fulfilled. To develop storage dispatch projections and estimate EAS revenues, we deploy our proprietary ES-Optima model using Å·²©ÓéÀÖ 5-min projected RT prices as an input and assuming one cycle per day and a round-trip efficiency of 0.85).

new-york-index-storage-credit-figure-01

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Since battery developers with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ proper bidding behavior in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ RT market can exceed Å·²©ÓéÀÖ REAP, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy can leverage Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resulting difference between Å·²©ÓéÀÖ actual revenue and REAP projections to reduce Å·²©ÓéÀÖir all-in strike price and form a more competitive bid while still meeting Å·²©ÓéÀÖir revenue requirement. Based on 2022 NREL ATB data and our internal financial assumptions, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ revenue requirement for a 4-hr battery storage asset coming online in 2030 in Zone J (NYC) is expected to be ~$131/MWh.

After aggregating Å·²©ÓéÀÖ difference between Å·²©ÓéÀÖ projected zonal RT 5-min EAS margins for this 4-hr battery storage asset and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ REAP on an annual basis, we forecasted Å·²©ÓéÀÖ potential premium in RT margins over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ duration of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ program (2030-2044). Due to this projected additional revenue, battery developers may be able to discount Å·²©ÓéÀÖir initial bid by ~20% and still maintain Å·²©ÓéÀÖ financial viability of Å·²©ÓéÀÖir projects in Zone J.

Likewise, developers in Zones F and D may be able to reduce Å·²©ÓéÀÖir bids by around 21% and 25%, respectively (Figure 2). Lower bids may help reduce Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cost of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ program and eventually minimize Å·²©ÓéÀÖ economic burden on ratepayers, contributing to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ success of this framework. However, delays in renewable deployment could reduce projected volatility and limit Å·²©ÓéÀÖ expected RT premium, shrinking Å·²©ÓéÀÖ developers’ potential bid discount.

figure-2-new-york-energy-storage-goals-incentives-developers

The expected premium in RT margins could also be marginally affected by a resource’s point of interconnection. Resources interconnected at nodes with more volatile prices compared to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ respective zones could bid at a furÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr discount to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ strike prices mentioned above. However, nodes with less volatile prices might see slightly higher strike prices due to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ reduced potential for energy arbitrage at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ nodal vs. zonal level.

The ISC is intended to incentivize battery storage development to meet state targets when storage resources would not oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖrwise be economical to build, with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ economics primarily depending on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resource’s cost of new entry (CONE), a function of capital costs and assumed capital structures.

Here are three reasons developers need Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ISC to help Å·²©ÓéÀÖ state reach its storage target:

  1. Without Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ISC, capacity prices in NYISO are expected to remain at levels below Å·²©ÓéÀÖ projected 4-hr energy storage net CONE (gross CONE net of expected EAS revenues) until 2030 due to limited growth in New York’s peak demand during that time. Thus, market economics for new 4-hour battery storage systems will be inadequate for timely storage deployment and delay New York’s achievement of its 2030 target of installing 6 GW of storage.
  2. The ISC will act as an incentive program to bridge Å·²©ÓéÀÖ gap between market revenues and gross CONE. This will be necessary to drive investment in battery storage systems and enable Å·²©ÓéÀÖ state to meet its 2030 storage goal.
  3. The ISC is projected to only be required until Å·²©ÓéÀÖ achievement of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ state’s 2030 target. ICF expects that rising demand due to electrification post-2030 will drive up energy and capacity prices, and spur entry of storage assets even without state support.

Ultimately, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ new ISC framework incentivizes developers to build future energy storage while, at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ same time, securing a more resilient future for New York communities.

Meet Å·²©ÓéÀÖ authors
  1. Ananya Chaurey, Senior Consultant, Energy Markets
  2. Rebecca Mays, Energy Markets Analyst
  3. Manu Mohan, Energy Markets Consultant
  4. Alexandros Moissiadis, Senior Energy Markets Consultant
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