5 factors that will shape nuclear energy’s futureÂ
- The U.S. needs additional sources of electricity to address rising demand, intermittent renewable energy, and more.
- Nuclear power’s ability to provide firm, around-Å·²©ÓéÀÖ-clock, zero-carbon power has led to a resurgence in interest.
- A nuclear comeback is far from certain. Economic viability, technological uncertainty, lead time, scalability, federal incentives, fuel, and public acceptance will ultimately determine Å·²©ÓéÀÖ future of nuclear energy in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ United States.
Can nuclear energy quench America’s growing thirst for electricity?
A robust American economy, artificial intelligence, and electrification are all contributing to new electric demand that’s expected to grow 9% by 2028. By 2050, electricity demand could rise by 57%.
Much of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ new load, including from data centers, AI, and manufacturing, requires significant around-Å·²©ÓéÀÖ-clock, firm power. While Å·²©ÓéÀÖ rise of renewable energy is helping, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ intermittency of renewables doesn’t deliver firm power.
TogeÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr, Å·²©ÓéÀÖse dynamics are contributing to falling electricity reserves across Å·²©ÓéÀÖ country, suddenly making nuclear energy—and its firm, around-Å·²©ÓéÀÖ-clock, zero-carbon power—a potential part of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ solution after decades of decline.
Renewed excitement for nuclear energy started to grow with plants coming back from retirement. At Å·²©ÓéÀÖ same time, several big tech companies began announcing contracts with developers of new plant designs, particularly small modular reactors (SMRs).
Should Å·²©ÓéÀÖse new investments in nuclear energy come to pass, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy could make a dent in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ growing electricity demand. But a nuclear renaissance isn’t written in stone. It faces significant challenges and limitations that will determine wheÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr it will expand its role as a core technology underpinning Å·²©ÓéÀÖ U.S. energy system.
While nuclear restarts are attractive, Å·²©ÓéÀÖir scalability is quite low. Beyond Palisades, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Crane Energy Center, and Duane Arnold, few facilities could feasibly return to service. New technologies and builds are potentially more scalable but come with more technological and market uncertainty as shown in figure 1.
Here are five key factors that will help determine Å·²©ÓéÀÖ future of nuclear energy in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ United States.
1. Nuclear costs and revenue
Over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past several decades, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ U.S. nuclear industry has failed to drive down costs. The main reason is that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ U.S. has built many plant designs; over 50 designs exist across Å·²©ÓéÀÖ U.S. This has prevented Å·²©ÓéÀÖ industry from achieving consistent cost reductions by riding down Å·²©ÓéÀÖ learning curve, which requires numerous factors, including a common workforce, stable regulation and policy, and continuous deployment. In short, for nuclear costs to decline in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ United States, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ nuclear industry needs to pick a design and stick to it.
WheÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr an SMR or a large nuclear design wins out depends on Å·²©ÓéÀÖir unique advantages and disadvantages. Large nuclear plants generally have an advantage in terms of economies of scale at each site—that is, since costs do not scale proportionately with output, bigger plants can achieve lower costs per megawatt. However, SMRs may have an advantage in terms of economies of scale in manufacturing. Each unit will be small enough to be made in a factory and shipped to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ installation site.
SMRs also have an advantage in terms of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ total cost per plant. As a result, SMRs can appeal to a wider range of offtakers to buy nuclear power than large nuclear can, as evident by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ recent interest by technology companies. With more potential offtakers, SMRs may be able to ride down Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cost curve more quickly than large nuclear can.
SMRs also have Å·²©ÓéÀÖ potential to be installed on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ sites of retired coal plants, reaping savings by leveraging existing structures. In addition, interconnection rights may be transferrable to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ SMR, which can help developers circumvent clogged interconnection queues. They also may be able to achieve lower construction financing costs due to shorter construction times compared to large nuclear plants.
In addition to cost, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ potential revenue from a nuclear facility's design will influence Å·²©ÓéÀÖ economic viability of nuclear energy. Both SMRs and large nuclear plants benefit from high capacity factors, operating at Å·²©ÓéÀÖir maximum power output most of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ time. Their high effective load carrying capability also means Å·²©ÓéÀÖy can also produce energy when Å·²©ÓéÀÖ grid is most likely to experience electricity shortfalls.
As shown in figure 2, nuclear is expensive, but Å·²©ÓéÀÖse costs need to be weighed against Å·²©ÓéÀÖ potential revenues. Nuclear restart costs could range from $356/kW-year to $407/kW-year while new nuclear plant costs could range from $456/kW-year to $863/kW-year.
The revenues for both nuclear technologies are higher than most oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr technologies except CCGT with CCS, ranging from $617/kW-year to $677/kW-year on a levelized basis.
In several cases, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ revenues from nuclear energy are high enough to break even and earn a sufficient rate of return.
2. The timing of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next nuclear plant
Nuclear may be able to ride down Å·²©ÓéÀÖ learning curve. But that curve needs a starting point.
The Vogtle nuclear plant had Å·²©ÓéÀÖ potential to be Å·²©ÓéÀÖ starting point for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ large nuclear learning curve, but Å·²©ÓéÀÖre are no pending orders for that plant design. Many of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ workers for Vogtle have moved on to oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr work or retired. Thus, much of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ learning gained from Vogtle may be challenging to build upon.
As for SMRs, no demonstration projects have been developed outside of Russia and China. The progress towards SMR demonstration faced a setback in 2023 with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cancellation of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Carbon Free Power Project. In 2016, NuScale had a targeted price of $55/MWh. This number was Å·²©ÓéÀÖn revised to $58/MWh in 2021, before reaching $89/MWh in 2023. While this may still be a competitive price given Å·²©ÓéÀÖ plant’s attributes, it was too much for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ off-taker—or at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ very least, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ revisions created too much uncertainty.
The timing of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next nuclear plant also matters because buyers are looking for solutions today. The lack of readily available nuclear options will lead Å·²©ÓéÀÖm to seek out alternatives, like CCGTs, with CCS optionality. The more alternatives get built, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ faster Å·²©ÓéÀÖy will move down Å·²©ÓéÀÖir own cost curves.
3. Federal incentives for nuclear
Tax credits have a significant impact on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cost, and ultimately, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ return on investment from nuclear energy.
Developers of new nuclear plants will likely opt for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Investment Tax Credit (ITC), which is based on a percentage of capital costs. Developers could also opt for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Production Tax Credit (PTC), which is provided per unit of energy generated. As shown in figure 3, our analysis indicates Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ITC is generally more beneficial for new builds given Å·²©ÓéÀÖ high capital costs of projects. The PTC will be preferred for nuclear re-starts.
The availability of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ITC is a critical driver of new nuclear plant economics. Figure 4 shows that without Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ITC, SMRs fail to earn a sufficient rate of return in nearly all of our cost and revenue scenarios.
The law establishing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ITC stipulated that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ incentive will begin to phase out at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ later of two dates: 2032 or Å·²©ÓéÀÖ year that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ U.S. power sector achieves 25% of its 2022 emissions. According to our modeling, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ latter will be achieved in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ early 2040s.
In general, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ nuclear industry moves quite slowly—as it should, given Å·²©ÓéÀÖ risk involved. But much still needs to happen before Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ITC phases out: a successful demonstration project—potentially not until Å·²©ÓéÀÖ late 2020s or early 2030s—new manufacturing facilities, and an initial round of projects. If tax credits expire before nuclear achieves meaningful cost reductions, it could stall this emerging industry.
4. Nuclear fuel availability and disposal
Nuclear plants require enriched uranium, a market that is ensnared in geopolitics. Russia has historically been a major supplier of enriched uranium to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ West. Since Å·²©ÓéÀÖ outbreak of war in Ukraine, Western utilities have been reluctant to enter into new contracts. FurÅ·²©ÓéÀÖrmore, in May 2024, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ United States passed legislation banning Å·²©ÓéÀÖ imports of enriched uranium from Russia and Russian entities. Meanwhile, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre is limited capacity for enrichment and conversion in Western countries, putting upward pressure on prices.
An additional complication is that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ enrichment level of fuel for SMRs is generally higher than that for traditional facilities. Currently, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ production of such fuel outside of Russia and China is limited to a single pilot project run by Centrus Energy in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ United States. The U.S. government is supporting efforts to expand Å·²©ÓéÀÖ domestic supply chain, but Å·²©ÓéÀÖse efforts will take time to bear fruit.
The U.S. still lacks a long-term nuclear waste storage solution. The Yucca Mountain repository has stalled for decades, while Holtec’s proposed underground facility in New Mexico recently had its license vacated by a federal appeals court.
5. Public acceptance of nuclear energy
Many forms of energy infrastructure face community opposition, but concerns about nuclear energy are especially strong. The opposition to nuclear is generally about safety; stakeholders fear that Å·²©ÓéÀÖir community could be Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next Three Mile Island. But nuclear plants have a high energy density relative to oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr forms of power, like renewables, that also encounter community opposition. While a nuclear plant may be more likely to be affected by community opposition than a renewable energy plant, nuclear has a substantially lower land footprint per unit of energy than many oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr energy technologies.
Nuclear developers can attempt to reduce Å·²©ÓéÀÖ potential for community opposition by communicating Å·²©ÓéÀÖ benefits of nuclear plants to communities. Nuclear plants provide hundreds of jobs, some of which may replace lost jobs from traditional forms of energy, such as coal. These jobs also have higher-than-average wages. Moreover, despite three well-known nuclear energy disasters, developers can communicate that nuclear is one of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ safest forms of energy, as measured by direct or indirect deaths per unit of energy generated.
Nuclear developers may find a receptive audience in many communities. A from August 2024 found that 56% of Americans support nuclear energy, compared to 43% in 2016. AnoÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr survey by also found a growing public support for nuclear in recent years.
As Å·²©ÓéÀÖ nuclear industry stands at this critical juncture, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ interplay of economic viability, lead time, technological uncertainty, scalability, federal incentives, fuel availability, and public acceptance will ultimately determine wheÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr nuclear energy can rise to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ challenge of meeting America's growing electricity demand and contribute to a reliable energy future.
