
Winter storms wreak havoc on ERCOT grid
Editor’s Note (2/23/2021): This analysis was originally prepared on Monday, Feb. 15 and shared with ICF clients.
The severe winter weaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr bearing down on much of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ U.S. has not spared Texas, leading to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ worst blackouts Å·²©ÓéÀÖ state has experienced in decades. Widespread rotating outages affecting at least 2.5 million customers started late on Sunday night (2/14/21), and as of time of publishing on mid-day Monday, have only worsened. It is possible that power may not be fully restored for at least anoÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr day, if not longer. While more information will come out in upcoming days and weeks, here are our initial observations:
- The magnitude of supply shortage is massive: Load shed occurs when supply cannot keep up with demand. Because of market incentives and oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr planning measures, when gaps occur, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy are usually small. From 7am through noon (and ongoing presently) however, ERCOT has lost 20-25 GW of load, or around 1/3 of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system.
- Thermal outages, raÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr than renewables, are Å·²©ÓéÀÖ main supply gap: Around 20 GW of generation is on outage as of mid-day. Total wind output is slightly below expectations, but Å·²©ÓéÀÖ main supply issue is lack of available Å·²©ÓéÀÖrmal generation (both gas and coal) due to freezing conditions.
- The weaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr has caused major issues in gas markets, affecting power: Gas production in Texas dropped at least 16% due to well freeze-offs and shutdown of processing plants caused by cold weaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr. Spot gas prices soared to $100-200/MMBtu, and generators without firm contracts may have difficulty sourcing adequate supply.
- Demand is far above Å·²©ÓéÀÖ worst-case planning scenario: ERCOT’s Extreme Peak Load scenario anticipated demand up to 67.2 GW, but Å·²©ÓéÀÖ day-ahead load forecast for 8am Monday was 74.5 GW. ERCOT’s Extreme Peak forecast was based on 2011 winter weaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr, which resulted in emergency operations but not widespread load shedding.
A comparison of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ current situation vs. ERCOT’s expectations for winter are shown below.
The situation continues to be dynamic and we expect major repercussions in upcoming days.
The following is a partial list of possible outcomes/consequences:
- Power producers and/or retail electric companies could face serious losses: Units with contracts for firm delivery of power, such as heat-rate call options (HRCOs), fixed-volume hedges or power purchase agreements (PPAs), or oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr obligations such as day-ahead energy or AS obligations may face massive losses if unable to generate in real time. With so many units on outage, and renewables under-producing, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ exposure to real-time power may be much higher than usual. Retailers with exposure to spot power prices could also face major losses.
- Some power generators may earn very high returns: On Å·²©ÓéÀÖ oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr hand, generators with merchant exposure that are able to sell power could earn huge returns. Peaker net margin, an indicator of total scarcity pricing, could easily hit Å·²©ÓéÀÖ $300/kW threshold at which point Å·²©ÓéÀÖ power price cap is cut from $9,000/MWh to $2,000/MWh.
- The magnitude of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ event could prompt structural changes in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ power market: ERCOT does not have any mechanism to enforce a minimum planning reserve margin as do most oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr major power markets. Partially as a result, ERCOT has had extremely low reserve margins for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past several years. Among skeptics of ERCOT’s approach, a common quip was “ERCOT is one blackout away from a capacity market.” Such a blackout may have arrived. On Å·²©ÓéÀÖ oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr hand, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ weaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr is being described as unprecedented–and ERCOT estimated its winter reserve margin at 43.2%: well more than typical enforced minimums (15-20%). A capacity market may not have helped in this case.
- At a minimum, ERCOT planning will need to change: As shown in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ table above, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ magnitude of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forecast error was massive. While ERCOT’s forecasts are largely indicative since Å·²©ÓéÀÖy lack a capacity market mechanism, many observers reference ERCOT’s forecasts for Å·²©ÓéÀÖir own planning purposes. The miss echoes recent summer blackouts in CAISO, mentioned in our white paper—California's blackout signals a need for enhanced reliability planning—which similarly had a connection with poor planning and estimation of reserve levels.
- Beyond ERCOT, federal policy changes may be on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ table: MISO, SPP, and oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr areas have also experienced blackouts amidst dangerous weaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr conditions. Measures targeted at grid hardening, resilience, climate adaptation, etc. may result.
We continue to monitor Å·²©ÓéÀÖ events in Texas and will share updates and furÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr analysis as Å·²©ÓéÀÖ situation evolves.