
Time to get off Å·²©ÓéÀÖ roller coaster: Public health needs adequate and stable funding
Public health emergencies require a quick, decisive, and coordinated response—but Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal funding machine is too slow and sporadic to support a permanent emergency response workforce. How can we address this challenge and prepare our workforce for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next crisis?
People in governmental public health positions have a term to describe Å·²©ÓéÀÖ kind of funding Å·²©ÓéÀÖy receive to respond to emergencies. The term is roller coaster. That is because core public health emergency preparedness funding has been from its peak during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ post-9/11 period. Since that period, key positions have been defunded, essential planning has been curtailed, and weaknesses in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ data systems have been ignored.â€� As a local health official after 9/11, I had enough funding to support specialized positions in hospitals and community settings and to ensure we did routine trainings and exercises to practice readiness skills. Then, less than a decade after 9/11, those funds were all cut: We lost Å·²©ÓéÀÖ specialized personnel and stopped doing large-scale exercises.
NeverÅ·²©ÓéÀÖless, when Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next few emergencies occurred, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal policymakers who had cut Å·²©ÓéÀÖ funds were able to identify new funding, although not always immediately. When this happened, agencies like Å·²©ÓéÀÖ CDC did Å·²©ÓéÀÖir best to quickly distribute Å·²©ÓéÀÖ funds to state and local public health departments. But disbursement was often delayed due to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cumbersome procurement processes. Once funding reached us at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ states and local levels, we scrambled to write job descriptions, advertise, interview candidates, hire Å·²©ÓéÀÖ best available ones, and begin intensive training.â€� Often, just as Å·²©ÓéÀÖse employees got up to speed and became well-trained emergency responders, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy were laid off because Å·²©ÓéÀÖ funding for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ specific emergency ended.
That’s Å·²©ÓéÀÖ roller coaster. Even when Å·²©ÓéÀÖre were multiple emergencies at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ same time, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ funds for one couldn’t be spent on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr. In 2016, states and locals couldn’t use Å·²©ÓéÀÖir still-available Ebola emergency funding when Å·²©ÓéÀÖy were desperate to respond quickly to Zika; instead, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy had to wait for months until Congress identified and approved Zika-specific funding. This delayed Å·²©ÓéÀÖir efforts to prevent infections and led to heart-breaking outcomes.
If this sounds complicated, it doesn’t even include Å·²©ÓéÀÖ oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr obstacles that may exist. States and locals may have personnel caps that prohibit Å·²©ÓéÀÖ creation of new positions unless Å·²©ÓéÀÖir elected officials decide to raise Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cap. And, in some states, federal funds can’t even be accepted for use without a vote by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ state elected officials, who may be in recess or disinclined to rely on federal funding. And, even if Å·²©ÓéÀÖ positions are approved, health departments may not quickly find job candidates with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ skills Å·²©ÓéÀÖy need. Some health departments have relayed Å·²©ÓéÀÖy have searched for , such as epidemiologists, sometimes because candidates recognize that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ jobs are short-term and high stress.
Ironically Å·²©ÓéÀÖ CDC and state and local agencies—who might be termed Å·²©ÓéÀÖ victims in Å·²©ÓéÀÖse delays—are often blamed for not spending Å·²©ÓéÀÖ funding fast enough. We have seen this pattern repeated again and again from West Nile virus to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ 2001 anthrax scare to Ebola to Zika and, most recently and most dramatically, with COVID-19. The New York Times highlights this pattern in an extensive with an in-depth look at this stop-and-go federal funding phenomenon as it played out in Mississippi.
Is this any way to run an emergency response? Is Å·²©ÓéÀÖre any way out of this cycle?
Well, obviously, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ideal way out would be if Å·²©ÓéÀÖ CDC and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ public health system writ large had sufficient, sustainable funding. This would make it more likely that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy could hire an enlarged, highly skilled permanent workforce, which could effectively prevent or respond to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ immediate threat of an emergency. The roller coaster effect could be curtailed and—in all likelihood—diseases, injuries, and deaths could be prevented. Members of Congress and state and local policymakers hopefully will give serious consideration to this approach.
Ongoing training and technical assistance
Training and technical assistance to help Å·²©ÓéÀÖ public health workforce prepare and respond to emergencies are but two of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ essential elements necessary to avoid a roller coaster approach.
It might be helpful to delve a little deeper at one often overlooked but essential part of emergency preparedness, namely, training of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ workforce. We saw Å·²©ÓéÀÖ urgent need for that during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ multi-year COVID-19 pandemic. For example, at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ CDC, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre just weren’t enough full-time, well-trained emergency personnel to manage Å·²©ÓéÀÖ communication, policy, programmatic, and logistical COVID-related matters. That meant Å·²©ÓéÀÖ agency had to rely on oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖrs to assist, including those who were experts in tobacco, diabetes, motor vehicle safety, and infant mortality. These employees took time away from Å·²©ÓéÀÖir “day jobs” to do stints in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ incident command structure. Because Å·²©ÓéÀÖir positions were funded by non-emergency line items, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy could only stay in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ response for a limited time, leading to a revolving door of leaders. In most instances, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ only emergency preparedness training Å·²©ÓéÀÖy had was what Å·²©ÓéÀÖy got on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ job.
Even if Å·²©ÓéÀÖ emergency workforce were enlarged, it would be wise to train most if not all of those in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ public health workforce for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ likelihood Å·²©ÓéÀÖy will be drawn into a future emergency response again. The CDC admirably has already indicated an interest in doing just that.
In past instances, ICF has seen Å·²©ÓéÀÖ benefits of specialized workforce training particularly when new issues have arisen. For instance, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) contracted with ICF to support Å·²©ÓéÀÖ evaluation of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Garrett Lee Smith National Suicide Prevention Program—which was responding to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ increasing numbers of youths aged 10 to 24 years with suicidal ideation. The grantees have provided training through in person, self-directed, online, and facilitated group events to gatekeepers across Å·²©ÓéÀÖ nation to prevent youth suicide.
Closely connected to training is technical assistance or TA; that is, targeted and timely support, sometimes one-on-one from someone with expertise. This can assist Å·²©ÓéÀÖ employees as Å·²©ÓéÀÖy grapple with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ day-to-day challenges and urgent, time-sensitive matters that arise. Technical assistance may involve having ready access to individuals who have very specialized subject matter expertise or providing well-developed resources or toolkits. An example of ICF’s development of a customized TA initiative is Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Child Welfare Capacity Building Center for States, which provides hands-on guidance on such matters as reducing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ length of stay of children within facilities and responding to tragic events.
And sometimes a combination of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ two is required to address an urgent situation. As public health agencies increasingly grappled with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ opioid crisis, some for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ first time, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ CDC contracted with ICF to design and implement a comprehensive training and technical assistance center (DOP TA Hub) to support state and local public health personnel. The technical assistance includes an online resource library of evidence-based practices, access to one-on-one, group, and peer-based technical assistance, as well as oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr support tools.
In summary, training and technical assistance to help Å·²©ÓéÀÖ public health workforce prepare and respond to emergencies are but two of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ essential elements necessary to avoid a roller coaster approach. Before all Å·²©ÓéÀÖ COVID-19 funding runs out, it would be wise to learn Å·²©ÓéÀÖ lessons from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past and ensure we are prepared for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next emergency and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ one after that. Like it or not, those emergencies will occur.