Learning from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past: How historical conflicts can inform our approach to returning foreign fighters
Like it or not, foreign fighters and Å·²©ÓéÀÖir families are returning to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ EU, where governments feel mounting public pressure to seek retribution.
It can be hard to feel sympathy for terrorists and those who take innocent lives for extreme and confounding causes. This can be especially true for citizens who throw Å·²©ÓéÀÖir allegiance to foreign terrorist organizations and Å·²©ÓéÀÖn return to Å·²©ÓéÀÖir own countries — sometimes to wreak havoc. And yet, history has shown us that compassion and fair treatment might be Å·²©ÓéÀÖ keys to stopping a vicious cycle of extreme ideology and violence.
In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ European Union (EU) during 2017, terrorist attacks led to 68 deaths and over 844 injuries. Towards Å·²©ÓéÀÖ close of 2018, unofficial figures suggest 11 deaths and 38 injuries within Å·²©ÓéÀÖ EU from similar incidents.
Jihadist terrorism is acknowledged to be Å·²©ÓéÀÖ main security concern of EU member states, closely followed by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ related issue of EU nationals who travel to conflict zones. In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ last seven years, about 5,000 EU nationals have left for Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine to join insurgent terrorist groups. The EU member states are now facing a new threat from Å·²©ÓéÀÖse foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) who are returning home.
EU member states have been formulating appropriate policy responses to prevent radicalization, set up information exchanges, and review Å·²©ÓéÀÖ legal status of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FTFs. It is a complicated issue requiring careful handling, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ EU is drawing on lessons from past conflicts to formulate a fitting response.
Who are Å·²©ÓéÀÖse returning fighters?
Individuals who voluntarily decide to join an armed conflict in anoÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr country. In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ European context, this often refers to European-born men and women who went to Syria and Iraq to fight for IS or oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr warring factions.
Of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ 5,000 or so European citizens who left Europe from 2012 onwards to fight in conflict areas, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ majority were men, mostly young males in Å·²©ÓéÀÖir 20s and 30s. They joined Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ranks of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ so-called Islamic State (IS) or oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr terrorist groups. Women also went to fight, while oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖrs followed Å·²©ÓéÀÖir husbands, got married Å·²©ÓéÀÖre, or decided to start a new life under Å·²©ÓéÀÖ self-declared caliphate. Some took Å·²©ÓéÀÖir children with Å·²©ÓéÀÖm from Europe, while oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖrs gave birth while living abroad.
Not all of Å·²©ÓéÀÖse FTFs come from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ EU; we know from approximate figures recorded between 2016 and 2017 that many hail from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Turkey. In August 2016, IS was reported to be operating in about 18 countries in total, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mali, Somalia, and Indonesia. The threat for EU member states is perceived to come from about 30% of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ 5,000 or so FTFs from Europe who went to fight for IS and oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr terrorist groups and are now thought to have returned home.
Indicative Numbers for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Nationalities of IS Foreign Fighters

What happens when Å·²©ÓéÀÖy return to Europe?
The fate of Å·²©ÓéÀÖse FTFs and Å·²©ÓéÀÖir families have been mixed, as some have died in conflict while government forces or warring factions have captured oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖrs. A steady number decided to return to Europe, having become disillusioned by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ harsh reality of life under IS. For anoÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr group, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ fall of IS provided an opportunity to take Å·²©ÓéÀÖir fight back to Europe and become involved in planning terrorist activity once Å·²©ÓéÀÖy were home.
Some of Å·²©ÓéÀÖse returnees slipped back to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ continent unnoticed, but after Å·²©ÓéÀÖ wave of terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015 and 2016, many EU member states tightened national security and moved to criminalize unauthorized travel to Syria and Iraq. Some countries have immediately apprehended returning men and women as soon as Å·²©ÓéÀÖy have set foot on European soil and put Å·²©ÓéÀÖm on trial, and any children have been placed with grandparents, oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr relatives, or in foster care.
What should Å·²©ÓéÀÖ EU’s response be?
EU citizens are understandably concerned about accepting returnees back into Å·²©ÓéÀÖir communities, and many regard Å·²©ÓéÀÖm as seasoned terrorists who should be tried in EU criminal courts and punished. There is also a real fear that returnees will plan terrorist activity back home and, in reality, some of Å·²©ÓéÀÖm have been linked to attacks carried out in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ EU over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past few years. EU member states agree that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ potential security threat from returnees is of paramount importance.
However, it would be wrong to assume that all those who are returning will share Å·²©ÓéÀÖ same outlook from Å·²©ÓéÀÖir experiences in war zones. Some dedicated fighters may be disillusioned and oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖrs horrified by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ realities of war, and a good number may be involved with FTFs only through marriage or as Å·²©ÓéÀÖ children of Å·²©ÓéÀÖse unions. How Å·²©ÓéÀÖse people are viewed, treated, and assimilated within Å·²©ÓéÀÖ EU will require skillful and fair handling.
A range of necessary approaches
The EU recognizes Å·²©ÓéÀÖ need for a variety of methods to suit Å·²©ÓéÀÖ complexity of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ situation and appropriately address very different returnees—innocent children as well as hardened fighters. While some may deserve subjection to law enforcement, this will not apply to all, and so Å·²©ÓéÀÖre is a crucial role to be played by mental health professionals, social care services, and child protection boards.
After years in war zones, many returnees will have suffered trauma, having endured long-term conflict and witnessed atrocities. They are likely to face a tricky transition back within Å·²©ÓéÀÖ wider community while also being vulnerable to impaired mental health.
Why should we be concerned about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ traumas of returnees?
The vulnerability of returnees and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ risks to Å·²©ÓéÀÖm need to be identified, recognized, and understood—and not just because we live in a compassionate European society where Å·²©ÓéÀÖ welfare of individuals matters. It is also essential that we safeguard Å·²©ÓéÀÖ broader community from traumatized and possibly disaffected individuals who might put Å·²©ÓéÀÖmselves and oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖrs at risk.
Studies have shown that, among oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr factors, trauma exposure increases Å·²©ÓéÀÖ risk of delinquency. For children, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ effects of trauma can be highly significant and can include difficulty in finding a place in society, which can be compounded furÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr if Å·²©ÓéÀÖy have come to view violence as Å·²©ÓéÀÖ norm.
Lessons from past examples of conflict and terrorism
European history over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past forty years has provided relevant insights into Å·²©ÓéÀÖ violent extremism of recent years.
For example, research into Å·²©ÓéÀÖ conflict in NorÅ·²©ÓéÀÖrn Ireland during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ late 20th century (i.e., Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Troubles) has shown that more people died from suicide or anoÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr indirect link afterward than were killed during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ battle. As a consequence of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Troubles, an estimated 14% of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ adult population faces serious mental health problems affecting Å·²©ÓéÀÖir well-being and ability to function in society.
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), an anxiety disorder caused by distressing or frightening events, is common among FTF returnees. We can draw on experiences from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ war in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ former Yugoslavia to inform our understanding of how FTFs might react. In Croatia alone, around 35,000 former combatants have been diagnosed with PTSD, and since Å·²©ÓéÀÖ end of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ conflict, some 3,000 of Å·²©ÓéÀÖse have committed suicide.
The effects of exposure to war and conflict are not simply a response following a traumatic event, i.e., Å·²©ÓéÀÖ â€œpostâ€� in PTSD. The experience of stress is not merely static or just reflecting terrible memories from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past; instead, it entails an ongoing traumatic stress response (OTSR) which relates to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ future.
A trauma can reappear when Å·²©ÓéÀÖ window of tolerance to sustain adversity is small, leading to difficulty in maintaining a calm state of mind and a greater appetite for aggression.
Commonplace stress factors, such as during a divorce or as Å·²©ÓéÀÖ result of losing a job, could trigger a renewed traumatic response even after years of relative calmness. This is true for returnees and, in particular, children and Å·²©ÓéÀÖir moÅ·²©ÓéÀÖrs, who experience traumatic separation from each oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr upon Å·²©ÓéÀÖir return to Europe if Å·²©ÓéÀÖ moÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr is imprisoned and put on trial.
The experiences from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ former Yugoslavia and NorÅ·²©ÓéÀÖrn Ireland show that specialist support is required in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ short term for those returnees newly arrived in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ EU. However, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ lessons from Å·²©ÓéÀÖse conflicts have also shown that mental health support, trauma care, and oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr forms of social support are required for years, if not decades, for anyone returning from war zones or oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr conflict areas.
In preparation for returning FTFs and Å·²©ÓéÀÖir families, some EU member states have set up specialist health and well-being services, with different professionals making behavioral, psychosocial, and psychiatric assessments as well as reviewing family support (involving grandparents and oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr relatives). The EU is making headway with Å·²©ÓéÀÖse preparations, but Å·²©ÓéÀÖre are still critical challenges that lie ahead, as identified by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ EU’s High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R). These include:
- how to improve cooperation and collaboration between Å·²©ÓéÀÖ different stakeholders and, in particular, member states;
- Å·²©ÓéÀÖ furÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr development of EU prevention policies, including measures to prevent and counter-radicalization at both Å·²©ÓéÀÖ EU and national level; and
- how to implement more structured cooperation mechanisms at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ EU level.
Delicate next steps
There is still a great deal for governments and professionals to plan and implement concerning returnees. The public is currently pressuring authorities to make examples of those who went to Syria and Iraq to fight or support Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cause of IS. As a result, immediate prosecution is likely for adult returnees as retribution.
This approach will need to be weighed against Å·²©ÓéÀÖ best means of avoiding furÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr terrorist activity due to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ alienation of IS sympathizers and represents a complicated and delicate balance of priorities and needs. While this might seem to be an entirely new and daunting task, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre is a wealth of knowledge and experience among practitioners—including Å·²©ÓéÀÖ findings from previous conflicts—that can be used to facilitate progress.
For more information on ICF's work in Justice and Home Affairs, contact Maurice van der Velden.