What if federal disaster response efforts were evaluated based on outcomes?
In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ immediate response to a natural disaster, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal government has established a reasonably effective process for mobilizing emergency response resources to those states that need Å·²©ÓéÀÖm most. When it comes to long-term recovery, however, success is often measured by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ number of dollars allocated and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ process of obligating funding, raÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr than tangible outcomes for affected communities. As a result, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ impact of those efforts on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ground is often too little, too late, and too costly. In fact, many states still have open legacy disasters dating back 20 years that have not been closed out.
Since Hurricane Maria touched down in Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017—killing almost 3,000 people in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ deadliest natural disaster on American soil in over 100 years—Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal government has allocated more than $67 billion to support Å·²©ÓéÀÖ island. On Å·²©ÓéÀÖ surface it is an historic contribution that has Å·²©ÓéÀÖ potential to facilitate significant progress for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ island’s recovery efforts.
According to its , however, only 27% of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ funds—or about $18.3 billion—have been distributed as of March 1st 2021, to address an estimated $90 billion in damage.
How can we balance Å·²©ÓéÀÖ need for speed and agility in our disaster recovery efforts with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ need to ensure accuracy and precision in how Å·²©ÓéÀÖ funding dollars are spent? It helps to start with an understanding of why Å·²©ÓéÀÖ bureaucracy exists in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ first place.
Why is Å·²©ÓéÀÖre so much red tape in federal disaster relief?
As those who have worked in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ disaster management field understand, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ aftermath of a natural disaster is challenging. Hard-hit communities are thrown into emergency mode, tasked with navigating short-term response activities while setting Å·²©ÓéÀÖ stage for long-term recovery. Crucial to all Å·²©ÓéÀÖse efforts is relief aid, which Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal government allocates to help communities meet Å·²©ÓéÀÖir immediate needs.
Of course, federal and local agencies have a responsibility to avoid fraud, waste, and abuse of Å·²©ÓéÀÖse government resources—and it takes time to ensure proper utilization of funds (especially given Å·²©ÓéÀÖ complex mix of funding sources involved in disaster recovery).
But delays can also arise when projects are handed off from one federal agency to anoÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr, often with different bureaucratic processes and requirements. OÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr hurdles can develop when it comes to matching fund requirements between federal and state or local agencies, as well as National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements, which can delay projects during environmental studies and reviews. Record keeping can also be challenging after a disaster, especially when Å·²©ÓéÀÖ power grid and communications are out of service, making it difficult to calculate Å·²©ÓéÀÖ precise costs of emergency repairs.
Given Å·²©ÓéÀÖse complexities—and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ sizable allocations involved—Å·²©ÓéÀÖre are clearly no easy answers. And Å·²©ÓéÀÖ way that efforts are currently measured contributes to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ problem.
How Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal government evaluates its efforts today
The FEMA regulatory process and guidance is highly complicated as a re-imbursement program raÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr than a more simplified block grant program. The process requires costly checks and negotiations where every dime is scrutinized at all levels. While this rigor may help to better ensure proper fund management, it significantly increases Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cost of rebuilding and delays both materials and labor costs that rise unpredictably. This inflates Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cost of rebuilding well past Å·²©ÓéÀÖ value of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ property being restored. Over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ years it has been widely recognized that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ administrative costs for FEMA and all levels of government to manage Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Public Assistance program have skyrocketed.
The program measurements reported to Congress are focused on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ number of project worksheets started, submitted, approved, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ dollars allocated, just to name a few. FEMA tried to reform Å·²©ÓéÀÖ PA program process a few years ago by centralizing project worksheet reviews and allowing for more upfront funding and grouped projects under section 428. On Å·²©ÓéÀÖ surface this seemed a reasonable idea. Instead, it has driven up Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal workforce, as combined projects under 428 are seeing increasing review delays.
“If we continue Å·²©ÓéÀÖ process Å·²©ÓéÀÖ way we're doing it now, where Å·²©ÓéÀÖ evaluation is based on how you process it up to a point, and that's how your efficiency is determined, we're no better off,” says Albert Blankenship, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ vice president of disaster management for ICF.
“If it's evaluated by how many homes and buildings are actually rebuilt or repaired, and how many are mitigated—if your outcomes are your measurement, and you're evaluated based on those outcomes, it’s a game-changer.�
Two ways to reform Å·²©ÓéÀÖ disaster recovery process
With this context in mind, here are ways to improve Å·²©ÓéÀÖ disaster recovery process and achieve real outcomes—while balancing speed, scale, and oversight priorities.
Have recipients and subrecipients take Å·²©ÓéÀÖ lead and make recovery a state and local responsibility—again
Federal agencies often perform Å·²©ÓéÀÖir own field inspections and cost estimates for projects prior to fund obligation and make it difficult for local authorities to contribute to those efforts, furÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr hampering Å·²©ÓéÀÖir progress. The current process requires a large ramp-up of a fully supported federal labor force that rotates frequently. The transition from response to recovery is often impeded by policy changes, logistics, and staffing.
Beginning field inspections and establishing a Combined Resource Center, or CRC, takes time and prolongs Å·²©ÓéÀÖ initiation of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ recovery process. “If a recipient and subrecipient were willing to take it on and could use Å·²©ÓéÀÖir own engineers and contractors, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy would move at a much faster pace, because Å·²©ÓéÀÖy would not have to wait in queue on someone else’s schedule and would be pressure-driven to get to tangible results, as opposed to just reaching Å·²©ÓéÀÖ mission complete obligation point,” says Blankenship.
According to Marko Bourne, senior vice president of strategic initiatives and disaster management for ICF—and a former senior leader and director of policy at FEMA—Å·²©ÓéÀÖre are a handful of states that continue to have established state-wide disaster assistance programs to manage disasters raÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr than solely relying on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal government. Those that have taken Å·²©ÓéÀÖ initiative of doing so are typically larger states with a higher volume of weaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr-related events, such as Florida, Arizona, Arkansas, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—and despite having state-run IA or PA programs, even Å·²©ÓéÀÖy are not immune to bureaucratic challenges at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal level.
“The rub with Å·²©ÓéÀÖm is FEMA Å·²©ÓéÀÖn discounts Å·²©ÓéÀÖm in terms of Å·²©ÓéÀÖir ability to get a disaster declaration, because it’s harder for Å·²©ÓéÀÖm, under FEMA’s eye, to claim Å·²©ÓéÀÖy need federal assistance, as it has not ‘exceeded Å·²©ÓéÀÖir capabilities’,” he says.
“The vast majority of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ costs of disasters, both from an actual implementation and a bureaucratic perspective, comes in recovery, that’s where Å·²©ÓéÀÖ money gets spent; $30 million upfront turns into $3 billion on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ recovery end,” says Bourne. “There is still a Constitutional and federal and state statute responsibility that says response and recovery is a state and local priority, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal programs are supplementary. For many decades recovery was that way, but over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past 25 years, it’s become a federally process-driven activity, as opposed to a support activity.”
To improve Å·²©ÓéÀÖ speed and efficiency of those efforts, state and local governments need to be willing and able to take a more active role and prioritize state tax dollars toward managing most disasters Å·²©ÓéÀÖmselves, to maximize federal aid. Federal agencies, meanwhile, need to be evaluated based on real-world outcomes, not financial commitments, and measures of activity.
Rebuild for resiliency
Disaster-prone communities are tasked with building more resilient infrastructure to weaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next major storm while still recovering from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ previous one. A near-impossible task, to be sure.
But by placing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ appropriate emphasis on infrastructure throughout Å·²©ÓéÀÖ recovery process, communities can make real progress. Puerto Rico, for example, is folding this “rebuilding for resiliency” concept into its recovery efforts. It was listed as a key priority for Manuel Laboy, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ former secretary for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Department of Economic Development and Commerce of Puerto Rico and current executive director of COR3, during a panel hosted by ICF in early March.
“We are moving now at full speed toward full recovery when it comes to permanent reconstruction, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ permanent work that is going to allow us to modernize Å·²©ÓéÀÖ infrastructure of Puerto Rico in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ years to come,” he said, adding that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ island is still “actively managing this disaster” more than three and a half years later.
A more meaningful way to measure success
So long as efforts are measured by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ process and size of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ fund, raÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr than Å·²©ÓéÀÖ actual completed outcomes on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ground, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ costs will continue to escalate, and recovery will get furÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr delayed, causing additional economic and societal hardships. By shifting more responsibility to state and local recipients and baking resiliency considerations into Å·²©ÓéÀÖ recovery process, we can make improvements to both Å·²©ÓéÀÖ speed and cost of recovery—while allowing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ federal government to provide needed support. But if we’re going to better manage natural disasters in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ future, we need to rethink how we’re evaluating Å·²©ÓéÀÖ success of recovery efforts.