
Price spikes vindicate ERCOT's market design
Major price spikes in ERCOT over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ week of Aug 12-16 provided not just much-needed revenue for market participants, but also much-needed practical validation of ERCOT’s energy-only market design. Amidst hot weaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr, real-time prices hit Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ERCOT price cap of $9,000/MWh over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ course of nearly four hours in total. After anoÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr disappointing start to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ summer, and growing skepticism about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ potential for meaningful price spikes in general, buyers should be compelled to respond with stronger contract prices for electricity, and quickly, to keep Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market healthy and incentivize new builds. This is a scenario we have been predicting for some time.
Proof of concept
ERCOT instituted Å·²©ÓéÀÖ operating reserve demand curve (ORDC) and a $9,000/MWh price cap in late 2014. Since Å·²©ÓéÀÖn, until last week, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market had only ever seen one fleeting glimpse of that glimmering unicorn, for ten brief minutes in January 2018. Yesterday’s events may not fully reverse Å·²©ÓéÀÖ prevailing winds of skepticism in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forward market despite low reserve margins (which reached a nadir in July, when on-peak prices for August traded at less than $100/MWh and future yearsâ€� forward strips were similarly anemic), but Å·²©ÓéÀÖ events of a single day need not accomplish that feat. At least Å·²©ÓéÀÖ concept is proved -- when stressed, extended episodes of $9,000/MWh are possible. The unicorn is real.
Grid is still at risk
To keep Å·²©ÓéÀÖ lights on Tuesday afternoon (August 13), ERCOT declared emergency conditions and deployed interruptible load resources (Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ERS program). This was required despite wind at peak that was near expected levels and only ~2 GW of resources on outage status. The demand was slightly higher than forecasted (Å·²©ÓéÀÖ projected peak was roughly 75.5 GW vs Å·²©ÓéÀÖ CDR forecast of 74.8 GW), but overall, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ situation was near Å·²©ÓéÀÖ expected case. The presence of high scarcity prices during “normalâ€� conditions indicates a grid at risk and short of capacity.
Variability in wind output alone can cause a 3.5 GW swing in reserves at peak. Had wind, outages, or weaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr been worse than expected, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ grid would likely have experienced blackouts. It could still easily face Å·²©ÓéÀÖse conditions eiÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ upcoming weeks of August 2019 or in 2020, especially with demand growth of 2-3% evident in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market. The grid needs to add 2 GW of firm capacity per year just to keep pace with demand growth, let alone resolve Å·²©ÓéÀÖ present shortage. From a purely commercial aspect, it becomes clear that furÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr price spikes can easily result.
Forward contracting needed
Bringing additional capacity online will require improved contract prices and a renewed willingness to invest. Weak summer prices have led to caution on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ part of buyers (and would-be financiers of new plants) and created a heavily ‘backwardatedâ€� futures market for power (lower prices over time).
Additionally, as we have noted before, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre remains asymmetry in ERCOT market developments as Å·²©ÓéÀÖ time required to bring a new plant online is much longer (a matter of years) than Å·²©ÓéÀÖ decision to retire an existing plant (a matter of months) in response to a change in spot prices. The Public Utilities Commission of Texas noted this problem during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ winter of 2019 and tweaked Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ORDC towards producing price signals earlier in response to dropping reserves. This action, coupled with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ practical validation of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ price spike model seen on Tuesday, should provide Å·²©ÓéÀÖ impetus to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market to improve contracting options and terms for new plants.
ERCOT’s model has already demonstrated its resistance to overpaying for excess capacity. The retirement of 5 GW of coal in late 2018 proved that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ concept worked in practice. Now Å·²©ÓéÀÖ model is proving its ability to compensate plants when capacity is absolutely needed—and we believe that need is clear today and in upcoming years.
Below you will find our 2018 blog post that discussed Å·²©ÓéÀÖ potential for this type of event to occur in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ERCOT Market.
Two months ago, ERCOT’s Capacity, Demand and Reserves (CDR) report going into 2018. Even though this figure is widely acknowledged to be well below both economical equilibrium and target planning levels, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ power market has reacted only modestly. However, a close look at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ situation this summer shows that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ $9,000 price cap for energy in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market may be sustained over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ summer peak this year, producing scarcity revenues far above what market forwards are showing and creating opportunities for owners and investors.
In markets with forward capacity market structures, this low of a reserve margin would yield very high prices ahead of time. In ISO-NE, a smaller system than ERCOT, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ price would hit Å·²©ÓéÀÖ maximum allowed price at 1.6 times Net Cost of New Entry (CONE). Even in PJM, a larger system, a 9.3% cleared internal reserve margin would yield Å·²©ÓéÀÖ maximum capacity price at 1.5 times Net CONE. But Å·²©ÓéÀÖ 2018 ERCOT market is not reflecting anything near Å·²©ÓéÀÖse levels.
ERCOT relies on a real-time scarcity mechanism that does not pay resources in advance, and it’s more difficult to predict than simply mapping installed capacity against a demand curve. Yet Å·²©ÓéÀÖ traded forward energy prices may be drastically underestimating Å·²©ÓéÀÖ possibility of high real-time scarcity. The chart below shows Å·²©ÓéÀÖ on-peak forward prices traded over February 7th for each month, and our estimate of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ scarcity inherent in each:
On-peak Forward Prices Traded Over February 7th
Month |
Peak Forward ($/MWh) |
Scarcity Estimate ($/kW) |
---|---|---|
May |
28.3 |
1.2 |
June |
38.2 |
3.9 |
July |
70.3 |
15.0 |
August |
107.1 |
27.5 |
September |
34.5 |
1.1 |
Total |
48.7 |
Note: Scarcity is administratively added on to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ SCED-cleared energy price. By subtracting what we project Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cleared energy price will be (using forward gas prices and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ERCOT system), we estimate what Å·²©ÓéÀÖ total scarcity adder would be over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ on-peak period.
The total estimated scarcity in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forward curve for 2018 summer is only around $50/kW. This is striking: with a reserve margin well below what anyone estimates is needed for reliability, and furÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr below what many estimate would provide market equilibrium returns, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ scarcity estimate in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forward is not reflecting close to what many would consider Net-CONE levels.
Again, with such reserve margin, NorÅ·²©ÓéÀÖastern forward capacity markets would be clearing in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ $120-160/kW range. This is important because prices above Net CONE are a signal for new capacity entry and return on investment for existing resources.
Many believe Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Operating Reserve Demand Curve (ORDC), Å·²©ÓéÀÖ primary mechanism for producing scarcity prices in ERCOT, is inherently volatile and — since it has produced very little revenue since its adoption in 2014 — this summer may be no different. While we routinely write about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ volatility of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ construct, a closer look at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ summer situation shows that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ occurrence of high scarcity events is not just possible — it’s expected.
Here’s what ERCOT’s 2018 Summer Assessment (SARA) — seasonal report that looks at operating reserves and possible contingencies — might look like compared to 2017:
ERCOT Summer Assessment: 2017 vs. 2018 (Projected)
MW - Summer Reserve Capacity |
Forecasted Case |
90th Percentile Thermal Outage |
90th Percentile Low Wind |
Extreme (2011) WeaÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr Load Adjustment |
---|---|---|---|---|
2017 |
5,506 |
3,632 |
2,471 |
1,813 |
2018 (anticipated) |
1,037 |
(721) |
(2,326) |
(2,658) |
ERCOT notes that any value below 2,300 MW indicates risk of EEA1, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ point at which ERCOT begins to take emergency actions such as manual all-call of resources, deployment of interruptible load (ERS), and use of emergency interties. The real-time price at this point is likely at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ $9,000/MWh price cap.
In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forecasted case, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ peak hour reserves dip to 1,037 MW, which means a shortfall of 1,263 MW before ERCOT could avoid emergency conditions. Using recent load shapes, we estimate that on average, nine hours over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ course of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ year would be within 1,263 MW of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ peak demand. If each of Å·²©ÓéÀÖse hours were at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ price cap, it would imply scarcity of $81/kW-yr just in those hours, and additional hours would see high prices as well, furÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr raising scarcity. For comparison, we estimate no year since 2011 has seen scarcity higher than ~$30-35/kW, with 2015-2017 being below $20/kW-yr each. FurÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr, this is just considering normal forecasted conditions, not accounting for possible contingencies.
We expect scarcity for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ remainder of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ year could be as high as $100-120/kW. FurÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forwards have only moved up to Å·²©ÓéÀÖse levels recently (showing ~$50/kW of scarcity), with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ January 23rd price spikes as a result of a delay in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ day-ahead clearing mechanism, unrelated to any fundamental summer peak condition. The August peak forward for 2018 as of December 7th was just $88.1/MWh, vs. Å·²©ÓéÀÖ $107.1/MWh as it stands in early February.
What could that mean? Forward prices tend to overweight recent historical outcomes and undervalue shifts in market fundamentals going forward. If Å·²©ÓéÀÖ summer of 2018 materializes with very high scarcity, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forwards may again overreact, allowing savvy market participants to lock in forward contracts. Though not without risks, this situation presents a tremendous opportunity to generators to earn above-new-cost returns at a time when capacity market pricing elsewhere have been modest.