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The future of airport concessions in a post-COVID-19 world

The future of airport concessions in a post-COVID-19 world
May 4, 2020
11 MIN. READ

Six options for how to ensure that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport concessions industry continues to be a robust and vibrant business for all.

COVID-19 has sent shockwaves throughout Å·²©ÓéÀÖ world. From layoffs to business closings, social distancing to shopping only on days that correspond to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ first letter of your last name, we have all seen and felt Å·²©ÓéÀÖ impact. Having been hit particularly hard, airports are searching for answers to problems on a scale that simply wasn’t imaginable six months ago.

Updates to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FAA guidance

The FAA has issued additional guidance on airport concession fees, some of which reverses earlier policies. First, and potentially most important, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FAA’s position on rent abatements has gone from “NO” to: “A decision to abate rent (including ‘minimum annual guarantees’ and encompassing fees) is a local decision. Rent abatement should be tied to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ changed circumstances caused by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ public health emergency and done in accordance with Grant Assurances 22 and 24, as well as related statutes. Where abatement results in shifting costs between various classes of airport tenants and users, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport sponsor is encouraged to consult with all affected parties...”

Besides giving each airport blanket permission to decide its own strategy, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ emphasis on shifting costs between various classes of airport tenants is crucial. In airports with residual airline agreements, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airlines will be required to make up Å·²©ÓéÀÖ difference between revenue to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport and required revenue to pay for airport development and oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr expenses. The key will be ensuring that airline charges remain fair and reasonable. Concessionaires need to understand this new business reality when Å·²©ÓéÀÖy ask for relief. If relief drives airline costs to a significantly higher level, Å·²©ÓéÀÖreby reducing airport cost-competitiveness, airlines may choose not to fly to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport or to operate fewer services. If flights do not return to Å·²©ÓéÀÖir pre-pandemic levels, Å·²©ÓéÀÖn Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport will not be able to recover former passenger levels. That will, in turn, harm Å·²©ÓéÀÖ concession program.

What will airports be in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ future?

No one is sure how long recovery will take. Nor do we know wheÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr travel habits will change permanently because of new practices learned during lockdowns. At least for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ immediate future, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre will be reduced demand for concession services. Most experts agree that Å·²©ÓéÀÖre will be no quick snapback of passengers, so airports face Å·²©ÓéÀÖ issue of having too many concessions locations or even too many operators. It may be necessary for an airport to close concession locations as Å·²©ÓéÀÖy may close portions of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport to reduce Å·²©ÓéÀÖir operating costs.

The this: “In coordination with airport sponsors, airlines, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr entities, closing gates or sections of terminals is likely to be acceptable if Å·²©ÓéÀÖ closure is executed in response to reduced passenger volumes and operations, is not discriminatory, and does not provide an unfair competitive advantage to one operator. For example, TSA has reduced lanes or consolidated passenger screening checkpoint operations in numerous airports in response to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ reduction in originating passenger volume.”

If an airport operator closes a concourse or a terminal, it would need to eliminate some concession spaces from its contracts, which may render some deals no longer viable. The competitive landscape may be—by necessity—altered. When passenger traffic does come back, airports should rethink how Å·²©ÓéÀÖir concession contracts work. Airports should carefully consider how Å·²©ÓéÀÖy structure deals and Å·²©ÓéÀÖir business models to ensure more flexibility to respond to potential future shocks.

The fallacy of Minimum Annual Guarantee (MAG)

In times of continued and prolonged growth, airports have learned to depend upon MAGs. In North America, airports tend to look at MAGs as Å·²©ÓéÀÖ least amount of acceptable rent. In oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr parts of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ world, MAGs are Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport’s exact expected rental payments. North American airports generally believe that if a vendor is paying a MAG, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre may be a business problem. Elsewhere, airports do not expect vendors to exceed Å·²©ÓéÀÖir MAGs. In eiÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr case, history has shown that MAGs are not supportable in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ event of severe downturns.

The current decline dwarfs those of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ recent past, as enplanement levels have dropped by upwards of 90%. However, MAGs in concession contracts still expect continued growth. Many airport agreements allow for a suspension of MAGs in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ event of a severe enplanement decrease. If Å·²©ÓéÀÖ metric for rent resumption is comparing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ current period to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ same period in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ previous year, by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ time Å·²©ÓéÀÖ world reaches year two of recovery—even if Å·²©ÓéÀÖ improvement is only slight and slow—Å·²©ÓéÀÖ contract may reinstate Å·²©ÓéÀÖ original MAG.

Charting a new course

It’s clear that fixed MAGs are unable to provide Å·²©ÓéÀÖ flexibility necessary to deal with severe occurrences. A different methodology is required to ensure that vendors are allowed to earn a fair return on Å·²©ÓéÀÖir investments, are able and willing to reinvest to improve and grow, and still provide a reasonable return to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airports. Where do we go from here? Let’s consider six potential options.

Option 1: MAG based on enplanements

The single factor most tied to concession success is Å·²©ÓéÀÖ footfall past Å·²©ÓéÀÖ concession locations. Hence, a fairer methodology for establishing a MAG is to base it on an absolute value per exposed passenger. There are means of counting passengers who pass a concession location, but few airports have installed such technology. A per enplanement MAG would be a strain on most airports’ accounting departments, especially if Å·²©ÓéÀÖ footfall varies by location. A by-location per passenger MAG may be too complicated for widespread implementation at this point.

Calculating MAG based on traffic in a larger area (e.g., Å·²©ÓéÀÖ concourse or terminal) is one possible answer. While this methodology is feasible, it does not get to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ actual number of passengers who see a concession location. What this option does do is change Å·²©ÓéÀÖ distribution of risk. In a standard MAG model, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ concessionaire bears a great deal of uncertainty with little risk falling to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport. With a MAG based on enplanements, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport accepts Å·²©ÓéÀÖ risk of failing to deliver enough enplanements. However, this still may not be Å·²©ÓéÀÖ most effective solution.

Option 2: MAG on a per square foot basis

Non-airport retail leases typically charge rent on a per square foot (PSF) basis. Most airports already calculate a PSF rent amount in Å·²©ÓéÀÖir airline rates and charges (e.g., office space with passenger access) that applies to concession-type spaces.

There are a few limitations, however, that make this a less than optimal solution. Primarily, in residual agreements, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ rates vary based on airport revenue. As a result, if concessionaires produce lower sales because Å·²©ÓéÀÖre is no traffic, it will result in space rental rates increasing.

Depending on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ level of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ sales decrease, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resulting increase in space rental rates may lead to concessions being no longer economically viable.

Because this rate base is not related to passenger numbers, it is equally as inflexible as a MAG set by any oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr means in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ event of significant changes in enplanements. As a result, airports may wish to consider going a step furÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr.

Option 3: Elimination of MAGs

As is becoming evident, basing financial remuneration on an aspirational or required number—or even recent experience—can fail. A MAG, as currently developed, is unsustainable in anything but relatively normal times. If Å·²©ÓéÀÖ basis for a MAG is what Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport thought it should be earning, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ amount may never be supportable even if a concessionaire signed Å·²©ÓéÀÖ contract. This leads to anoÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr possibility: to eliminate MAGs and tie airport payments to sales only.

This essentially flips Å·²©ÓéÀÖ rent risk from being entirely on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ vendors (in a MAG-based model) to being entirely on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport. While Å·²©ÓéÀÖ vendor still has some risk to pay for its investment and employee wages, rent is solely dependent on sales. Given Å·²©ÓéÀÖ focus on bottom line profits, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ investment in variable costs—such as employees, training, maintenance, and product development—required to earn additional sales may no longer make economic sense.

There are numerous ways to frame a contract without a MAG. Most simply, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport and vendor could agree to a fixed percentage rent. Alternatively, different percentages could be charged for varying levels of sales or by assigning eiÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr fixed or variable rates to different product categories (e.g., one percentage for food and non-alcoholic beverage and a separate percentage for alcoholic drinks only). Regardless, this shifting of risk may not be acceptable to airports.

These three options do not change Å·²©ÓéÀÖ underlying airport-concessionaire relationship. Yet one of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ most severe barriers to entry, particularly for small businesses, has always been limited access to capital. With Å·²©ÓéÀÖ new economic and industry realities, capital access may be an even greater hurdle. That may limit Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ability for new entrants, as well as making some concession opportunities less attractive to vendors. Given that we are considering a new paradigm, airports and concessionaires may wish to consider three oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr business structure options.

Option 4: Airport-concessionaire joint ventures

Airports outside of North America are already experiencing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ benefit of joint ventures between Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport operator and concession operators. While Å·²©ÓéÀÖ model has primarily been used for duty-free concessions, it has worked equally well for oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr types of concessions.

In this model, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport takes on two roles: landlord and partner in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ operation. The joint venture lease must be similar to those given to oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr concessionaires, and enforcement of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport’s rules and performance requirements must be uniform. While Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport might invest capital in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ joint venture, it must be involved in a management committee overseeing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ business. How involved Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport gets in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ day-to-day operation is Å·²©ÓéÀÖ option of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport and Å·²©ÓéÀÖir partner(s). One of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ keys, however, to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ success of this model is Å·²©ÓéÀÖ realization that each partner brings particular strengths, skills, and abilities. When one partner tries to do too much, it will lessen Å·²©ÓéÀÖ benefits of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ joint venture. As such, most airports should stay out of active management of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ concession location, leaving that to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ expert partner.

AnoÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr advantage of this model is that it may provide a means to improve Å·²©ÓéÀÖ levels of involvement of smaller and local businesses. The joint venture model allows Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport to supply capital, likely at a lower cost than its business partners. The airport operator also brings knowledge of how to do business in an airport environment while allowing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ concessionaire to concentrate on what Å·²©ÓéÀÖy do best: operate a highly successful restaurant or shop.

Option 5: The Trinity (or Trinity Plus) model

The Trinity model can be considered an extension of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ joint venture model. First championed by Martin Moodie—one of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ stalwarts of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ concession industry—this model has airports, retailers, and suppliers cooperate in developing concession operations. Considering all Å·²©ÓéÀÖ current changes in our business, this model may be a solution to sharing risk and encouraging a strong representation of critical brands in airports. The Trinity model is particularly applicable to duty-free concessions, where it is practical to divide a store into departments wherein vendors (e.g., Channel, Rolex, Hermes) are given Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ability to design and operate Å·²©ÓéÀÖir mini outlets.

Airlines have a significant stake in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ quality of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ concession program because of its impact on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ passenger experience. Airlines value an attractive commercial program because it makes a better background for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ expression of Å·²©ÓéÀÖir brand. The passenger experience results from a combination of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ actions or inactions of airport, concessionaire, and airline. This suggests that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ best way to ensure an outstanding customer experience would be for this Trinity (or Trinity Plus, including Å·²©ÓéÀÖ supplier) to work togeÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr. Each contributes its expertise, capital, and support to result in a uniform, consistent, and superior customer experience throughout Å·²©ÓéÀÖ passenger’s journey.

While this model is new, a unified strategy could bring about a unique airport concession experience to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ benefit of all participants. This strategy is particularly applicable for a hub airport where Å·²©ÓéÀÖ hub airline’s brand expression is likely already an important part of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport’s perceived brand.

Option 6: The airport as concession operator

If an airport can become a partner in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ operation of a concession, it might also consider being a concession operator on its own. This option would give Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport operator Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ultimate control over its concession program as it takes on full responsibility for all business aspects. Manchester Airport Group in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ U.K. had started to operate a restaurant in Å·²©ÓéÀÖir home airport before Å·²©ÓéÀÖ pandemic, so Å·²©ÓéÀÖre is precedent for this strategy.

The airport operator is always present and has a wealth of knowledge about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport. However, it is unlikely that most airport operators have staff with specific expertise in concession operations and management. Without this expertise, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ concession will almost certainly fail to operate at an optimum level. Airports would also have to establish supply lines for products that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy have not procured in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past. These supplier relationships are unlikely to have Å·²©ÓéÀÖ same economies of scale as those of national concessionaires, which means Å·²©ÓéÀÖ costs of operation may be higher.

Airports would also have to hire and manage many additional hourly employees. The airport human resources function is likely not ready to handle that, as Å·²©ÓéÀÖ annual turnover of concession employees often approaches 150%. Most airports are not prepared to be on a constant hiring cycle for entry-level hourly employees. Airports would have to offer benefit packages to Å·²©ÓéÀÖse employees in line with those provided to oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr employees of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport. These benefit packages may make Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cost of employment significantly higher than Å·²©ÓéÀÖ all-in employment costs for most concession operators.

Looking ahead

The airport environment is complex and has become even more challenging due to COVID-19. Airports should consider alternative methodologies for managing and operating Å·²©ÓéÀÖir concession programs for concessions to remain viable business options. While it may never be “business as usual” again, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ airport and its business partners need to adjust to a new normal. There will still be passengers, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ concession industry needs to be ready to serve Å·²©ÓéÀÖm.

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