ISO-NE auction reveals increases in demand response and renewables
ISO-NE’s latest forward capacity auction saw prices decrease for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ sixth-year in a row, but it also saw some interesting “firsts” in new participants and increased demand response and renewable energy participation. The market is in a state of flux as Å·²©ÓéÀÖ generation supply transitions to be less baseload reliant.
As we show in this webinar, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market is looking to evolve to accommodate state mandated goals and address concerns for winter energy security. Watch now to see:
- Why ISO-NE hasn't been able to buck its downward price trend;
- How newer resources are making more noise; and
- How Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market will adjust itself for secure supply in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ future.
Transcript
Chris: Welcome to ICF's webinar on ISO New England's capacity auction outcomes and outlook. My name is Chris McCracken and I'll be moderating Å·²©ÓéÀÖ webinar today. Before we get started, I just want to cover a few ground rules for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ webinar. First of all, to prevent any issues with background noise, all attendee lines will be muted. We will be taking Q&A at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ end of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ webinar, but you can submit questions at any time using Å·²©ÓéÀÖ question box at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ bottom of your control panel.
We're also recording Å·²©ÓéÀÖ webinar today. We'll send an email with a link to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ recording in a few days when it's available. Please feel free to share that with oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr colleagues, or listen to it again if you'd like. And finally, I'll remind you of this at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ end again, but please do take a few minutes to take Å·²©ÓéÀÖ survey once we're done. We review Å·²©ÓéÀÖ feedback very carefully and we use it to make our following webinars a better experience for all of you.
You'll be hearing today from three of ICF's top experts on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ New England markets: George Katsigiannakis, Himanshu Pande, and Rohit Vadakattu. If you listened to our webinar on this subject last year, you would've heard Å·²©ÓéÀÖm and be familiar with Å·²©ÓéÀÖir voices. Their contact info is shown here, and you would have seen it in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ lead-up slides as well, but we'll be showing that to you again at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ end so you can reach out to Å·²©ÓéÀÖm directly with oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr questions and things. And with that, I'd like to turn it over to Himanshu to go over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ agenda and start Å·²©ÓéÀÖ webinar.
FCA trends and FCA-13 auction results
Himanshu: Good afternoon, everyone. ISO-NE conducted Å·²©ÓéÀÖ 13th Forward Capacity Auction in February 2019, and today we are going to discuss Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FCA 13 auction results. The agenda that we have for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ presentation is shown in Slide 4. We start Å·²©ÓéÀÖ presentation with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ discussion on historical FCA trends, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖn giving a snapshot of FCA 13 auction results. Thereafter, we discuss Å·²©ÓéÀÖ key market changes that have happened since FCA 12, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ primary driver of FCA 13 auction prices. In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ third section, we discuss some of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ key outcomes and observations from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FCA 13 auction, and in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ last section, we are going to discuss Å·²©ÓéÀÖ potential market updates that could have impact on future capacity prices and capacity auctions.
Slide 6 gives a snapshot of historical trends for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forward capacity auction. In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ graph, we have shown Å·²©ÓéÀÖ total amount of cleared capacity and cleared capacity prices over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past 13 auctions. As you will see from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ graph, until FCA 7, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was excess supply in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system, and ISO-NE had a vertical demand curve, as a result of which Å·²©ÓéÀÖ prices were actually clearing at an administratively-set floor prices. In FCA 8, ISO-NE eliminated Å·²©ÓéÀÖ administratively-set floor price, because of which we observed significant amount of retirement in FCA 8, which in turn tightened Å·²©ÓéÀÖ supply-demand balance, and resulted in price spike in FCA 8.
In FCA 9, ISO-NE implemented Å·²©ÓéÀÖ pay-for-performance initiative, and this was Å·²©ÓéÀÖ first auction when New England also implemented a linear demand curve. This was Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction when actually prices peaked in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ISO-NE capacity auction, but after this auction, we have seen a constant decline in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ prices. The decline in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past few auctions is mostly driven by incremental supply in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system because of new resources. And, in addition to that, because of significant increase in a passive demand response, we have also seen incremental supply clearing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction.
Additionally, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre have been significant downward pressure on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ demand because New England has been increasing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forecast on distributed solar generation, which in turn has basically reduced Å·²©ÓéÀÖ overall reliability requirement of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ systems. In short, incremental amount of new capacity additions and declining demand has resulted in significant oversupply in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past few auctions, which has been resulting in, you know, declining trend in capacity prices.
The next slide provides a snapshot of FCA 13 auction reserve. The auction closing price was $3.80 per kilowatt month, and all Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity zones and interfaces cleared at this price except Å·²©ÓéÀÖ New Brunswick interface. New Brunswick interconnection interface was actually export constraint, as a result of which it cleared at a discounted price of $2.68 per kilowatt month. Overall, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction cleared with a total supply of approximately 1.1 gigawatt in excess of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ net installed capacity requirements. As a result, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction had a reserve margin of around 19.8 percent compared to a target reserve margin of 16 percent.
In general, we have around 4 percent excess supply in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system. This was also Å·²©ÓéÀÖ first auction when CASPR was implemented, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was a substitution auction in addition to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ primary auction. However, we did not see any significant participation in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ substitution auction. The substitution auction clearing price was zero dollars, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was only 56 megawatt of capacity that cleared to substitution auction.
The slide on page eight provides a summary of key drivers that impacted Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices in FCA 13. We have categorized Å·²©ÓéÀÖ drivers based on Å·²©ÓéÀÖir impacts. The factors that put downward pressure on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices were new capacity additions, continued transition to convex demand curve, higher energy margins realized in 2018, more energy efficiency, and mystic cost of service agreement.
The factors that basically provided support to capacity prices were termination of Clear River Energy Center, and significant exit via static and dynamic de-listing in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity auction. Four eighty-five megawatt of Clear River Energy Center Unit 1 has been clearing in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forward capacity auction since . However, due to permitting delays and local opposition, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ plant is not expected to come online starting June 1, 2019, as a result of which New England actually disqualified this plant from participating in FCA, and removed its megawatts from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FCA supply. The next section discusses some of Å·²©ÓéÀÖse key drivers in more detail, along with changes in key market parameters since FCA 12.
Recap of key market changes
Net installed capacity requirements and net CONE are two important parameters that can impact demand curve use for a specific auction. As you will see from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ chart on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ left side, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ net installed capacity requirements have been on decline primarily due to decrease in load forecast and increase Å·²©ÓéÀÖ amount of distributed solar over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past few years. However, compared to FCA 12, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was no material change in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ net installed capacity requirement in FCA 13.
Similarly, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was no significant change in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ net CONE as well. Net CONE had materially declined in FCA 12, and that was mostly because New England had switched Å·²©ÓéÀÖ reference technology from combined cycle to a CT unit, as a result of which net CONE declined from $11.64 per kilowatt month to $8 per kilowatt month. However, between FCA 12 and FCA 13, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was no material change, and net CONE just marginally increased from $8.04 per kilowatt month to $8.156 per kilowatt month. So, given that Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was no material change in net installed capacity requirement and net CONE, Å·²©ÓéÀÖse were not like, you know, one of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ major divers that impacted Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FCA 13 auction.
Although Å·²©ÓéÀÖre were no changes in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ demand curve due to net installed capacity requirements and net CONE, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was furÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr transitioning of demand curve to convex shape as shown in Slide 11. In FCA 11, ISO-NE switched from linear to convex-shaped demand curve. However, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy decided to actually do this change by facing it over FCA 11 to FCA 13. Since FCA 11, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ demand curve has been shifting towards Å·²©ÓéÀÖ left to account for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ change in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ shift from linear to convex demand curve. In this auction, because of this transitioning, demand curve was shifted towards left as shown in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ right chart, and, you know, this would have put downward pressure on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices in FCA 13.
There were significant amount of retirement de-list bids and static de-list bids in this auction as well. Mystic 7 had submitted a retirement de-list bid in this auction, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ retirement de-list was approved by ISO-NE. Overall, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was 598 megawatts of retirement de-list bids, and major portion of that capacity was Mystic 7. There was 3.1 gigawatts of capacity that had submitted static de-list bids in FCA 13. However, out of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ 3.1 gigawatts, 2.5 gigawatts of capacity withdrew that static de-list bids just before Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction, and in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ end Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was only 670 megawatt of static de-list bids that were left in FCA 13. Out of that, only 139 megawatt was eventually approved by IMM, and most of that 139 megawatt reflect Yarmouth 1 and Yarmouth 2 static de-list bids.
I would like to highlight that even though Å·²©ÓéÀÖ 530 megawatt of Westbrook's static de-list bid was rejected by ISO-NE. This unit still did not end up clearing in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction. The capacity supply obligation for Westbrook in FCA 13 was zero. So, although its static de-list bid was disapproved, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resource still did not clear Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction.
The oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr change that happened in FCA 13 was Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was unmitigated supply from Mystic 8 and Mystic 9. In FCA 12, both Mystic 8 and Mystic 9 had submitted dynamic de-list bids. However, because of reliability reasons, New England rejected Å·²©ÓéÀÖ dynamic de-list bid of Mystic 8 in FCA 12, and Mystic 8 was actually forced to clear in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FCA 12 auction.
For FCA 13, Mystic 8 and 9 submitted Å·²©ÓéÀÖir retirement de-list bids, but New England rejected those bids as well because of reliability issues, and decided to provide a cost of service agreement to Mystic 8 and 9, as a result of which, Mystic 8 and 9 are receiving out-of-market payments, and New England was permitted by FERC to allow Å·²©ÓéÀÖse units to participate as price taker in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction. Compared to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ last auction, since last auction already had Mystic 8 forced into Å·²©ÓéÀÖ supply, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ only change compared to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FCA 12 and FCA 13 was Mystic 9. In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ last auction, Mystic 9 was allowed to dynamically de-list from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction, but in FCA 13, Mystic 9 was forced into Å·²©ÓéÀÖ supply. So, if you compare Å·²©ÓéÀÖ net supply change for Mystic 8 and 9 between Å·²©ÓéÀÖ two auctions, it was just 710 megawatt capacity of Mystic 9.
Slide 14 provides overall net supply change between FCA 12 and FCA 13. So, as you will see from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ graph, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ majority of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ new supply came from, you know, new generators which were around 837 megawatts. Then Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was new passive DR which was around 566 megawatts. There was new un-mitigated supply, which was 710 megawatts, which was mostly Mystic 9. Majority of this excess supply was offset by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ incremental retirement de-list bids on reduction in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ supply, so Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was 598 megawatt of retirement de-list, which mostly reflected Mystic 7. There was decrease in existing passive DR of around -187 megawatts, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖn Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was a disqualified capacity of Clear River Energy Center, which was around 485 megawatts.
Overall, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ net supply increase after accounting for all Å·²©ÓéÀÖse changes was 875 megawatts, but Å·²©ÓéÀÖn Å·²©ÓéÀÖre were incremental static and dynamic de-list that happened in FCA 13 compared to FCA 12, and this incremental amount was around 771 megawatts. So, in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ end, if you account for static and dynamic de-lists from FCA 13, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ net supply change between FCA 12 and FCA 13 was only 104 megawatts. So, in short, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ overall supply change between Å·²©ÓéÀÖ two auctions was not significant, and which is why Å·²©ÓéÀÖ overall amount of cleared capacity also between Å·²©ÓéÀÖ two auctions was very similar.
Higher energy margins was actually one of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ primary drivers, which ICF thinks was driving Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices down in FCA 13. So, as you all know that New England has significant amount of oil capacity in its capacity mix, and all Å·²©ÓéÀÖse oil resources are actually currently marginal in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity market, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖy set Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices.
In New England, Å·²©ÓéÀÖse oil resources make significant amount of energy margins during extreme winter conditions, and that's due to gas supply constraints, and natural gas price spikes, and natural gas plant outages, which are mostly driven by natural gas pipeline outages. In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ table on Slide 15, we are showing a comparison of winter energy prices in 2018 and 2017. As you can see, because January 2018 had a cold snap, and because of severe winter conditions in January 2018, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ natural gas price and power prices spiked in New England, which would have resulted in significantly higher margins for oil units. Because Å·²©ÓéÀÖse units realized very high margins in 2018, we believe that, you know, overall, Å·²©ÓéÀÖir bidding in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ February 2019 auction was reflecting those incremental energy margins that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy made in 2018, which basically put a downward pressure on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices.
Slide 16 basically illustrates all Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity price bridge and all Å·²©ÓéÀÖ factors that we just discussed, and what Å·²©ÓéÀÖir impact on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices was. So, as you will see from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ graph, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ demand curve change had a very marginal downward impact on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices. The incremental new supply had a material impact, but most of that impact was offset by incremental existing removals and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ static and dynamic de-listing removals. In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ end, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ major impact basically came from higher energy margins, and that was driven by incremental oil margins or incremental energy margins that oil resources realized in 2018 mostly due to severe winter conditions in January as a result of cold snap. We do expect that, you know, if 2019 winter is mild compared to 2018, Å·²©ÓéÀÖn Å·²©ÓéÀÖ oil resources are going to bid higher in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next capacity auction, which might basically put pressure on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices in FCA 14.
In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next section, Rohit Vadakattu is going to discuss Å·²©ÓéÀÖ key outcomes and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ observations from FCA 13.
FCA-13 key outcomes and observations
Rohit: Thank you, Himanshu. Looking at Slide 8, this is Å·²©ÓéÀÖ first...Slide 18, sorry, this is Å·²©ÓéÀÖ first auction where Å·²©ÓéÀÖ CASPR regime was put into play, and we had substitution auction take place. Because it's a new market change, it was difficult to predict Å·²©ÓéÀÖ participation and behavior of resources in this. That being said, we did see in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ last substitution auction just a mere 53 megawatts of capacity exchanging positions, and that was between Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Pawtucket Natural Gas plant and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Vineyard Wind plant, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ latter of which was prohibited from participating...clearing to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ RTR exemption due to its location in federal waters. The clearing price in substitution auction of zero dollars implies that vineyard was willing to accept Å·²©ÓéÀÖ CSO as a price taker at $0 per kilowatt month, and this allowed Pawtucket to realize Å·²©ÓéÀÖ full $3.80 per kilowatt month as a severance payment.
Looking forward, FCA 14 is not expected to be drastically impacted due to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ small number of megawatts exchange hands, but if more capacity did participate, it might have had more material impact in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ later auctions as more capacity retires from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system.
Moving on to Slide 19, we see approximately 990 megawatts of generators de-listed from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system through dynamic and static de-list bids. So, initially, approximately 3.1 gigawatts of capacity were applied for static de-list bids, but approximately 2.5 gigawatts withdrew Å·²©ÓéÀÖ de-list bid. That being said, we will keep an eye out, as Himanshu mentioned, on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Yarmouth units, which d supply, give in static de-list bids and dynamic de-list bids, which indicates a degree of exit system in future auctions. And we will keep a closer eye on that. As Himanshu mentioned also, Westbrook did submit a de-list bid that was rejected by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ISO, but it did end up not clearing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction, anyway.
Going forward to Slide 20. Clearing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction did come as a surprise to many, including us as well. As you can see in our calculations here, we calculated Å·²©ÓéÀÖ estimated net CONE based on ISO-NE and CONE information, as well as Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forward data based on trade as of February 2019. Based on that, we were able to calculate Å·²©ÓéÀÖ net CONE of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ new CC to be approximately $6.10 per kilowatt month, which means that Killingly must eiÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr be seeing a favorable gas supply or must have secured anoÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr line of revenue which allowed it to clear at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ lower clearing price of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FCA 13.
Moving on to Slide 21. This last auction also saw a healthy participation by new renewable capacity. Approximately 199 megawatts cleared Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction, of which 145 megawatts cleared through Å·²©ÓéÀÖ RTR, and 54 megawatts of Vineyard Wind capacity cleared through Å·²©ÓéÀÖ substitution auction.
In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next auction, when Vineyard Wind is permitted to participate through Å·²©ÓéÀÖ RTR, we expect to see Å·²©ÓéÀÖ amount of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ new renewable participation and clearing in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction to increase given Å·²©ÓéÀÖ fact that Å·²©ÓéÀÖre are still 300 megawatts of RTR exemption remaining in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system.
Moving on to Slide 22. We also see an increase in battery participation as generation capacity. Approximately 450 megawatts of battery capacity offered as capacity in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ last auction, and of that, only 5 megawatts cleared. However, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ fact that approximately 500 megawatts did offer its capacity shows an upward trend in battery participation, and we see this trend continuing in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market.
Moving on to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next slide, Slide 23. Continuing with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ series of first [SP], in this auction we saw Å·²©ÓéÀÖ most amount of new demand response to clear compared to all Å·²©ÓéÀÖ previous auctions, and this reflection approximately 654 megawatts of new DR. However, despite this new record DR, it still doesn't meet Å·²©ÓéÀÖ CELT forecast, and this is partly because some DR which cleared in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FCA 12, which amounts to approximately 200 megawatts, did not clear in this auction, resulting in an overall approximately 440 megawatts of more DR clearing in this last auction relative to FCA 12.
Moving onto Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next slide, Slide 24. Positive demand response and EE are also...continuing with series of first, we saw...Å·²©ÓéÀÖ first auction, we solar-cleared Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction as passive demand response. And even though if it was offered and it was offered in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ prior auction, it did not manage to clear. Likewise, this is Å·²©ÓéÀÖ first time that solar and storage participated and managed to clear approximately 20 megawatts in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction. In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ active DR phase also, battery continues to participate and clear in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ last auction. So, that being said, I will pass...throw onto George who will talk about market updates and looking ahead.
Market updates and looking ahead
George: Good afternoon, everybody. As many of you know, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ New England ISO is very concerned about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ energy security, especially Å·²©ÓéÀÖ availability of energy to meet Å·²©ÓéÀÖ energy demands during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ winter months. Gas pipeline constraints and system resources where power plants and nuclear power plants have been retiring have created some dynamics that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system, although it does have sufficient megawatts, may not under extreme conditions have Å·²©ÓéÀÖ energy requirements to satisfy Å·²©ÓéÀÖ demand. We expect Å·²©ÓéÀÖ proposed solutions to...proposed measures to address this problem to have major implications to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity market.
And, actually we already saw that in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ last auction, as Himanshu discussed before, Mystic 8 and 9 were allowed to participate in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction as price takers. This fact by itself, ignoring all Å·²©ÓéÀÖ oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr factors, has depressed Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices, something in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ range of $1.80 per KW month. If, for example, those units were allowed to leave Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction as Å·²©ÓéÀÖy have a request requested, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ prices would have been higher in that range, I think, including those factors.
Similarly, following this Mystic debate, FERC requested New England ISO to implement permanent solution to this problem, and ISO is in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ process of doing so. They're trying to have those implemented from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FCA 16, but for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next upcoming auctions, Auction 14 and Auction 15, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy have proposed what Å·²©ÓéÀÖy call Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Interim Winter Energy Security Proposal, which was actually debated a couple of weeks ago in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ NEPOOL Participants Committee. And, although it was rejected, did not receive enough votes to be filed as a joint proposal at FERC, ISO-NE indicated that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy planned to file this proposal with FERC at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ end of March.
In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next slide, 27, we do provide a high level overview of what this proposal is about. The design is not different from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forward capacity market. You have a forward sale of allowable inventoried energy at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forward settlement today that is calculated from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ISO to reflect Å·²©ÓéÀÖ LNG contract. And it was set actually at $82.50 per megawatt hour. So, resources...qualified resources, resources that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy can...inventoried energy can sell forward. They are inventoried energy at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forward settlement rate times Å·²©ÓéÀÖ allowable inventoried entity.
And Å·²©ÓéÀÖ allowable inventoried energy reflects Å·²©ÓéÀÖ energy that can be provided by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resource over a maximum duration period, which was set by ISO to reflect three days, or 72 hours, times Å·²©ÓéÀÖ maximum output of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ research, that's Å·²©ÓéÀÖ maximum that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resource can provide, of course, resources that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy cannot...hydro, for example, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy cannot have so much energy stored. They can provide a lower allowable inventoried energy in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forward auction. So, you sell this forward commitment and you receive a payment for that.
And Å·²©ÓéÀÖn, similar to Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity market, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre's Å·²©ÓéÀÖ spot sale. Spot sales are occurring during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ trigger conditions. Trigger conditions have been defined by ISO to reflect Å·²©ÓéÀÖ days where Å·²©ÓéÀÖ average daily temperature is at 17 degrees Fahrenheit, or below, and during those conditions, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ actual inventoried energy of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ committed resources is measured. Any deviations from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ committed inventoried energy are penalized or receive bonuses. And so, with this framework, resources that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy can provide energy during constrained conditions, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy receive a forward payment, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖn Å·²©ÓéÀÖy can settle deviations from that.
Obviously, this measure is going to provide incremental payments as required to resources that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy can provide energy during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ energy-limited hours. In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ top of that, since generation of electricity during those scarcity hours will have an impact on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ inventoried energy and decrease payments, Å·²©ÓéÀÖse opportunity costs are reflected in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ energy margin. Overall, we do expect that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ energy or prices also are going to be increased.
In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next slide, we provide what resources are allowed to participate in this . As you expect, those are resources that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy can store fuel on-site, like nuclear, and coal, and oil. Batteries also can participate, but renewable resources cannot. As it's expected, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resources that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy receive incremental payments through this measure, Å·²©ÓéÀÖir de-list bids with higher revenues will be lower.
As I said before, energy prices during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ trigger hours are going to be higher, so all Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resources are going to be receiving higher energy prices. Overall, we do expect Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Interim Energy Security Proposal to have a negative impact on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices for FCA 14 and FCA 15. Of course, that doesn't mean that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ revenue of all Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resources is going to be lower. Resources that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy have fuel storage capability will be receiving overall higher payments, but that would create Å·²©ÓéÀÖ dynamics that resources that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy don't have those fuel storage capabilities with lower capacity payments will leave Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction sooner.
And that can create Å·²©ÓéÀÖ dynamics to interchange with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ state-sponsored resources that, as outlined here, New England states have very ambitious plans to bring online a significant amount of renewable resources and battery resources in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system, which, as you may know, through CASPR, to receive capacity obligations, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy have to exchange Å·²©ÓéÀÖir megawatts from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ existing megawatts in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system.
Many of you have seen a lot of rumors about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ residential solar resources clearing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity auction. What's happening is Å·²©ÓéÀÖ solar facilities, that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy meet some certain requirements in terms of size and in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ connections rating, can participate in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forward capacity auction as passive demand resources...passive demand resource is a different name for energy efficiency...with a trigger price of zero. That's what has happened with those resources as those resources leave Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction as passive demand resources.
A question that we have been asked from our clients is, what is our views on this trend to be continuing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ future? New England ISO has...actually Å·²©ÓéÀÖ states of New England ISO have plans for continued subsidization of residential solar, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ question is if we do see Å·²©ÓéÀÖ residential solar play a major impact in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ forward auctions in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ future. We do believe that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ amount...Å·²©ÓéÀÖ subject [SP] provided for those type of resources are significant, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ impact in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity market is not going to be so significant that this extra revenue will provide additional motivation for large amounts of residential solar to participate in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction.
In terms of oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr parameters that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy will affect capacity prices, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ next two auctions, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market rules don't allow any increase in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ performance payment rate, and that's not going to be a parameter that...we'll continue to increase Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices. But, starting from FCA 15, when Å·²©ÓéÀÖ payment rate is almost doubling, we'll see a significant impact on that.
OÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr smaller impacts by this upcoming capacity prices, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ linear portion of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market will be eliminated in FCA 14, and as Himanshu mentioned before, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ energy margins of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resources could also impact Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity price in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ future.
Questions and answers
Chris: Great. Thank you very much, George, Himanshu, and Rohit. We've got several questions that have come in over Å·²©ÓéÀÖ course of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ webinar, and so we'll start getting into those now. If you still have questions, please submit Å·²©ÓéÀÖm, as we discussed, in your question box in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ toolbar.
To start, first question is, can you describe Å·²©ÓéÀÖ difference between static and dynamic de-listing?
Himanshu: Yes. Basically, New England has four types of de-listing. The first one is called retirement de-list, which basically simply means that you want to retire completely from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market, like, all Å·²©ÓéÀÖ markets: energy, ancillary, and capacity. Then Å·²©ÓéÀÖre is a de-list called permanent de-list which is basically similar to retirement, but it only retires you from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity market. You can still participate in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ energy and ancillary market.
Now, dynamic de-list and static de-list bids are slightly different. They basically allow resources to de-list Å·²©ÓéÀÖmselves from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction for one capacity period. Dynamic de-list basically is based on a threshold that is established by New England. For example, in FCA 13, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy had established a dynamic de-list bid of $4.30 per kilowatt month. If Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction prices basically fall below $4.30 per kilowatt month, Å·²©ÓéÀÖn any resource from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ supply can dynamically de-list from Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction without giving any justification.
On Å·²©ÓéÀÖ oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr hand, in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ static de-list bid, you basically have to specify what is your static de-list bid before Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction. And, static de-list bids are actually higher than dynamic de-list bids, and so you have to basically file with FERC and IMM, and get an approval from IMM, you know, to get your static de-list bid approved. Any unit that is submitting a static de-list bid is basically expecting a capacity price higher than Å·²©ÓéÀÖ dynamic de-list bid, which is $4.30 per kilowatt month, and has to basically get an approval from IMM.
George: Thanks, Himanshu. What I want to clarify, also, here is that all Å·²©ÓéÀÖ lists, with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ exception of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ dynamic de-list, are submitted before Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction. The dynamic de-list bid is proposed during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction. That's a big difference between those two types...you need to think those two different categories, before Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction and during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction. Dynamic de-list during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction.
Chris: Next question is, you say Å·²©ÓéÀÖ reserve margin is 19 percent based on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction results. That understates Å·²©ÓéÀÖ margin. According to NERC, ISO New England has a firm capacity reserve margin of about 27 percent. So, why isn't Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction clearing to zero as it should?
Himanshu: The 19 percent is a margin that we mentioned is basically based on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cleared supply, you know, that is receiving capacity revenues and it's clearing in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction. The 27 percent is a margin that you are quoting, basically includes both cleared and uncleared supply. And, this is a phenomena that we have seen also in PJM where, you know, your total with a margin including cleared and uncleared supply is more than 30 percent, but if you look at just Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cleared supply with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ margin, Å·²©ÓéÀÖn it's only 22 percent.
Your question that why isn't Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction clearing at zero, that would be true if Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction had a vertical demand curve. The way auction works is basically it's an intersection of supply curve and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ demand curve. If you had a vertical demand curve and if you had excess supply, Å·²©ÓéÀÖn Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction prices will eiÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr clear at zero, or will clear at a floor, which ISO might have established. And, that's what used to happen in New England before FDA 7. They actually had a vertical demand curve, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖy had auction floor price of around $3 to $3.50 per kilowatt month.
And because Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was so much excess supply, you know, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices were clearing at Å·²©ÓéÀÖ floor. But now that is not Å·²©ÓéÀÖ case. It is now like a convex-shaped demand curve. In Å·²©ÓéÀÖ end, it's Å·²©ÓéÀÖ intersection of supply and demand, which basically determines how much supply is going to end up clearing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction. Anything that basically bids higher than that intersection point ends up not clearing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market.
Chris: Okay, great. Thank you, Himanshu. Next question, please talk more about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ trends for both DR and battery storage, and specifically, do you know how far out of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ money Å·²©ÓéÀÖ oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr bids for batteries were since only 5 megawatts cleared?
George: Yeah. We don't know what that offer is. So we...
Himanshu: Yeah. The bid information is confidential, so we don't know how much, like, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ offer bids for batteries were out-of-Å·²©ÓéÀÖ-money, but we do expect, if batteries are not subsidized, as of today, Å·²©ÓéÀÖy definitely are very expensive to economically come online or to economically clear Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market.
Chris: Great. Next one, if ISO New England thinks that some gas-fired generation is not firm, why are Å·²©ÓéÀÖy clearing it through Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auction, through Å·²©ÓéÀÖ FCA? If Å·²©ÓéÀÖ pay-for-performance reforms don't succeed in making gas-fired generation fuels secure as it was designed to, why don't Å·²©ÓéÀÖy just fix Å·²©ÓéÀÖ provisions, for instance, by increasing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ penalty levels? But you'd love to.
George: Yeah. That's a good question. So, I guess this question was asked to New England ISO. And, I was expecting Å·²©ÓéÀÖ penalty rates to fix Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system. Don't forget that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resources have not get used to this...Å·²©ÓéÀÖ PI was implemented last May, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ sorted [SP] condition that we observed, it was just one certain condition during Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Labor weekend. And you should leave this market design plenty of time and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resources to understand what Å·²©ÓéÀÖy have to deal with to expect a response, and I don't think that that was available.
Himanshu: Yeah. And, I would like to add that I don't think, basically...I think penalty rates in New England are going up. They are going to become, like, $5,500 per megawatt hour in 2024 auction. I think Å·²©ÓéÀÖ main problem is Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system doesn't have scarcity right now, and that's mostly driven by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ fact that Å·²©ÓéÀÖre's so much excess supply in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system since FCA 9 that, you know, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was a time when New England actually went into shortage.
And now, since Å·²©ÓéÀÖn, New England now has, like, 19 percent to 22 percent as a margin, and that's just reflecting cleared supply. If you actually add Å·²©ÓéÀÖ uncleared supply, you probably add 25 percent to 30 percent of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ margin level. When you have so much excess supply in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system, it doesn't basically result in any scarcity hour. So nobody takes those scarcity premiums or those risk penalties in a serious way.
If you see like...and this is Å·²©ÓéÀÖ same situation that we are seeing in PJM where you have, like, total with a margin of more than 30 percent, if you include Å·²©ÓéÀÖ uncleared supply. And, you know, if basically we have a recurrence of polar vortex where Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system...like, both PJM and New England saw substantial amount of scarcity hours, I think that would be Å·²©ÓéÀÖ year when you will actually see substantial amount of penalties, and people will start taking some of Å·²©ÓéÀÖse performance penalties more seriously.
George: Don't forget that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system is not constrained in terms of megawatt liability. The system is constrained in terms of energy. That's a big difference, that Å·²©ÓéÀÖ PI pay-for-performance, it's a capacity measure. So, fixing Å·²©ÓéÀÖ limitation on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ energy needs to come in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ different parts of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ market design on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ energy side than Å·²©ÓéÀÖ auxiliary reserve status as New England ISO plans to do when Å·²©ÓéÀÖ implement permanent measures.
Chris: The next question is, is Å·²©ÓéÀÖ Interim Winter Energy Security Proposal available to dual-fuel gas/oil units?
George: Yes. Actually, dual-fuel units, depending on Å·²©ÓéÀÖir oil storage capabilities are allowed to participate.
Chris: Okay.
Himanshu: And I think in one of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ previous questions we didn't answer, like, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ trends on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ DR, because we answered Å·²©ÓéÀÖ battery storage specific question but we didn't talk about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ trends in DR. Overall, I think, in terms of trends in DR, in New England, basically, DR comprises of eiÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr passive demand response and active demand response...and passive demand response historically has been mostly energy efficiency, which is driven by, you know, state mandates and state budgets that New England has.
We do expect Å·²©ÓéÀÖre will be continued growth in passive demand response going forward, but we also believe that New England has very aggressive targets for energy efficiency, and that I think mostly are driven by Å·²©ÓéÀÖ linear cost curve that Å·²©ÓéÀÖy assume. And we think that once you utilize Å·²©ÓéÀÖ low-hanging fruit, it is going to become incrementally more expensive to implement new energy efficiency measure. We believe that although Å·²©ÓéÀÖre will be increased in passive demand response going forward...or energy efficiency going forward, but it will be less than what ISO-NE is forecasting in Å·²©ÓéÀÖir self-report.
Then, we do expect that Å·²©ÓéÀÖre will be some incremental participation on passive demand response from oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr types of resources, like what we have started observing, like, you know, solar participating as a...distributed solar participating as passive demand response. There could be some incremental increase in passive demand response from, you know, distributed solar participation. And Å·²©ÓéÀÖn, on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ active DR side, you know, in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ past, we have been observing active DR to decline over time, but we did observe in this auction that active DR basically marginally increased. And that was, again, mostly because New England has recently changed Å·²©ÓéÀÖ definition of "active DR."
And Å·²©ÓéÀÖn, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre are oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr type of resources, you know, that basically participated as active DR in this auction. You know, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was little bit amount of battery storage that cleared as active DR, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖre have been oÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr type of resources as well. So, we do expect that active DR might, like, you know, marginally increase in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ long run because of incremented participation from resources such as batteries, solar, which sometimes instead of participating as generator, participate as DR because of Å·²©ÓéÀÖir small size. But we don't expect this to be like a material driver forward.
Chris: All right. Thanks, Himanshu. I think this is a follow-up to one of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ questions you were answering earlier about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ pay-for-performance provisions and Å·²©ÓéÀÖir impact, anoÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr question. If Å·²©ÓéÀÖre's no scarcity of firm capacity, are Å·²©ÓéÀÖ concerns about fuel secure supply baseless?
George: No. You should consider some...you have only gas-fired generators in New England, and you face severe...and you have plenty of Å·²©ÓéÀÖm, 200 percent reserve margin, and so you face severe constraints on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ gas supply. So, having megawatts without fuel, that will not do you any good in terms of liability.
That's exactly what I mentioned before about Å·²©ÓéÀÖ fuel security and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity market, two different...Å·²©ÓéÀÖy're related, of course, of concepts [SP] but I do agree with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ treatment of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ ISO-NE of separating Å·²©ÓéÀÖm and putting Å·²©ÓéÀÖ fuel security under an auxiliary service on that energy side instead of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity market. PJM is moving a similar direction.
Himanshu: It's basically, you know, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ step taken to mitigate something that could happen. I give you an example, like in 2018, when Å·²©ÓéÀÖ cold snap happened, we didn't observe, like, significant scarcity in New England, but that doesn't mean Å·²©ÓéÀÖ system was completely reliable. If you actually look at 2018 generation stack in New England, 50 percent of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ dispatch or generation was coming from oil resources.
Now, imagine a market where all Å·²©ÓéÀÖse oil resources retire just because, you know, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ capacity prices are not high enough and Å·²©ÓéÀÖse oil resources are not economic. And we have seen in FCA 13, Å·²©ÓéÀÖre was significant de-listing of oil resources. So, if those oil resources were not Å·²©ÓéÀÖre on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ hindsight in 2018, Å·²©ÓéÀÖn definitely system would have been on scarcity. In order to avoid to reach to that situation, New England basically wants to add some form of fuel security.
Chris: Next question is, why was Å·²©ÓéÀÖ demand curve vertical previously, in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ earlier auctions?
George: That was Å·²©ÓéÀÖ standard design across Å·²©ÓéÀÖ United States. So, New York City initially implemented this concept of demand curve to recognize that things are not binary, eiÅ·²©ÓéÀÖr you have Å·²©ÓéÀÖ...but Å·²©ÓéÀÖre's some incremental value. After you met Å·²©ÓéÀÖ target reserve margins which differ by region, or for a specific level, let's say 16 percent New England, at 16.1 percent Å·²©ÓéÀÖ liability contribution of Å·²©ÓéÀÖ resources is not zero. It declines, but it's not zero. This marginal liability, impact MRI, which is actually concept for Å·²©ÓéÀÖ convex scale New England implements is not utilized in all capacity markets with exception of MISO, but is thinking of using Å·²©ÓéÀÖ same thing. PJM has it, New York has it, so we believe it's a superior design.
Chris: Great. I think we'll close on this one. Does ICF provide auction clearing price estimates for future bids? And I think Å·²©ÓéÀÖ answer is yes, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ answer would be, "Please reach out to George, Himanshu, or Rohit, Å·²©ÓéÀÖ contact information shown on Å·²©ÓéÀÖ screen, and Å·²©ÓéÀÖy can talk to you about ICF services in regards to that." And, obviously watch for white papers and things in advance of next year's auction as well.
With that, I'd like to close, and remind you again before we go to please fill out Å·²©ÓéÀÖ survey. We really do appreciate Å·²©ÓéÀÖ responses, and use what you say to help guide us in Å·²©ÓéÀÖ development of future webinars and Å·²©ÓéÀÖ implementation of future webinars. And, with that, thank you very much for joining us, and you will be receiving an email shortly with Å·²©ÓéÀÖ recording. Thank you.